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TRANSCRIPTION
The attempt has been made to transcribe the Arabic script and terms as in the  New 
Edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI2)1. As for Arabic proper names, they are 
transcribed as in the EI2 as well, unless they have a common English correspondent. 
Accordingly, e.g. Marrakesh is used instead of the Arabic Marrākush. Arabic dialectal 
expressions  were adopted in  their  dialectal  forms,  e.g.  ahl  kutub,  as  found  in  the 
Dictionnaire Ḥassāniyya – Français2, otherwise as commonly found in literature.  As 
for the few Berber terms and proper names, they are transcribed as in the Encyclopédie 
Berbère.3
1 GIBB, Hamilton A.R. [et al.]: The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960 – 2004. 
In the following quoted as: EI2. 
2 TAINE-CHEIKH, Catherine: Dictionnaire Ḥassāniyya - Français. Paris: Geuthner Dictionnaires,  1988 -. 
3 CAMPS, Gabriel [et al.]: Encyclopédie Berbère. Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1985-.  
In the following quoted as: Encyclopédie Berbère.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AI Amnesty International
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
AU African Union (former: OAU, Organization of
African Unity)
EI2 New Edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
ENMINSA Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara
Frente POLISARIO Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra 
y Río de Oro 
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
MINURSO Misión de Naciones Unidas para el  referendo en el 
Sahara Occidental
OCP Office Chérifien des Phosphates 
ONAREP Office  National  de  Recherches  et  d’Exploitations 
Pétrolières  
SADR Ṣaḥrāwī Arab Democratic Republic
SPLA Ṣaḥrāwī Popular Liberation Army
SRC Ṣaḥrāwī Red Crescent
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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INTRODUCTION
I spent the academic year of 2006/2007 in Cádiz (Spain) where I came across a poster 
proclaiming  “Vacaciones  en  Paz”,  a  humanitarian  and  political  project  that  gives 
Ṣaḥrāwī children the possibility to come to Spain and spend some carefree weeks in a 
war-free environment.4 I  must admit,  that  up to that  day I had never heard of the 
Ṣaḥrāwīs or the Western Saharan conflict before. So I started to read more about the 
Ṣaḥrāwī people and their protracted struggle for freedom and self-determination. The 
majority,  about  200  000 Ṣaḥrāwīs,  live  in  exile  in  the  refugee  camps  of  Tindūf 
(Algeria).
I decided to write my master thesis on  the Western Sahara, hoping to acquaint the 
people in my social environment with this issue and to reveal the complex deep-rooted 
dispute’s causes. 
The Western Sahara is on the list  of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the United 
Nations (UN) since the 1960s and is nowadays still considered a colony. Bordered by 
Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, the Western Sahara was administered by Spain until 
1975 and was then annexed by Morocco and Mauritania who affirmed their claim to 
the territory based on historical,  ethnical,  religious  and geographical  affiliation.  In 
1979  Mauritania  renounced  all  its  claims  to  the  Western  Sahara.  Consequently 
Morocco took control over the whole disputed territory and the Frente POLISARIO, 
the Ṣaḥrāwī independence movement, fought a bitter guerilla war. 
After  over 20 years of unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations, finding a definitive and 
fair solution to the dispute seems impossible. In 1991 the diplomatic efforts achieved a 
cease-fire between the involved parties, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, but the 
UN did not succeed in determining whether this territory would be kept by Morocco or 
become an independent state. Being in this state of neither war nor peace, a state of 
4 This project also exists in Austria initiated by Karin Scheele; for more information see: 
http://www.ferien-vom-krieg.at/index.php?pid=8 [01.09.2008]
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constantly waiting for a promised referendum, the Ṣaḥrāwīs have been enduring either 
in the Moroccan occupied zone or in the refugee camps of Tindūf for the last 33 years. 
The  Moroccan  occupation  of  the  Western  Sahara  is  a  clear  violation  of  the  UN 
resolutions  on  decolonization  and  the  right  to  self-determination.  What  are  the 
obstacles to the implementation of the UN proposal? 
I decided to give this paper the focus on the historical background of the sustained 
conflict up to today’s events. The background provided is necessary to help understand 
why after so many years of fighting and waiting no real progress has been achieved 
yet. 
Chapter one gives a geographical and demographical overview of the arid Western 
Sahara whereas chapter two touches the issue of the role of natural resources in this 
conflict. 
The roots of the Western Sahara conflict date further back than the present conflict. 
Hence, chapter three focuses on the parentage and the traditional way of life of the 
Ṣaḥrāwīs, the indigenous people of the disputed territory. Furthermore, it dwells on the 
historical relations of the Ṣaḥrāwīs with the Moroccans to their north and Mauritania’s 
emirates to the south. 
In chapter four I explore the time of Spanish colonization and the Ṣaḥrāwī resistance 
against the European foreign rule. Furthermore, the consequent economic and social 
changes due to the discovery of the region’s mineral wealth are pointed out. 
Chapter five deals  with the rise  of  Ṣaḥrāwī nationalism and the emergence of the 
Ṣaḥrāwī nationalist movement, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-
Hamra y  Río  de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) which has been the most visible face of 
Western Saharan nationalism, aiming at an independent Ṣaḥrāwī state.
When Spain abandoned its Saharan colony to Morocco and Mauritania,  the Frente 
POLISARIO had to face a new enemy in its anti-colonial struggle. This is adduced in 
chapter six. The diplomatic battle on the part of the UN is as well  subject of this 
chapter. Finally, I analyze briefly the current situation and the future prospects of the 
dispute.
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1. COUNTRY PROFILE
1.1.   GEOGRAPHY 
Map of Western Sahara5
5 http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g8900.ct001700 [04.04.2008]
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The Western Sahara ( ةييبرغلا ءارحيصلا  - al-Ṣaḥrā' al-Gharbiyya)  is located in northwest 
Africa. Until 1975 the territory was generally known as Sahara Español6. It lies to the 
south of Morocco, north and west of Mauritania and southwest of Algeria – country’s 
frontiers, that were drawn by the colonial powers without little regards to geographical 
and ethnic characteristics.7 The only natural boundary is the Atlantic Ocean with over 
1,062 km of coastline to the west.8 All large cities – except for Ṣmāra9 ( يصةرام ) – are 
located on this  coastline:  the capital  al-l Uyūn10 (نويعلا),  Boujdour11 (رودج ويب)  and 
Dākhla12 (ةلخاد). The coastal waters offer rich fishing and at Bou Craa (وب عارك)13, high-
quality phosphate is extracted. 
From Spanish colonization time, the country was divided into two main sections: 
-  Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’  (ءارمحلا ةيقايس) “the red channel”, forms the northern third of the 
country of 82,000 sq km. The capital al-a Uyūn is situated in this part.
6 In this work, the denotation Western Sahara is used for the disputed territory throughout the paper. 
7 Today’s boundaries of the Western Sahara are the result of agreements made among the colonial 
powers France and Spain in 1900, 1904 and 1912.   cf. chapter 4.1.
8 MERCER, John: Spanish Sahara. London: Ruskin House, 1976. p.23.
In the following quoted as: MERCER: Spanish Sahara.
9 Ṣmāra is Western Sahara’s only precolonial city. There was plenty of water around it, pasturelands 
were nearby and the city was an important stop on the caravan routes. It was built in 1898 by Mā’ al-
w Aynayn, the great  Ṣaḥrāwī anti-colonial leader of the first decade of the 20th century (cf. chapter 
4.2.).  PAZZANITA,  Anthony G./HODGES,  Tony:  Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara.  2nd Edition. 
London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1994. p.410. 
In the following quoted as: PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara.
10 Al-l Uyūn is situated on the banks of the river Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’, about 30 km from the Atlanic 
coast.
11 About 170 km south of  al-a Uyūn, the Portuguese first reached Cape Boujdour (also known as 
Cabo Bojador)  in the mid 15th century.  BARBIER,  Maurice:  Le conflit  du Sahara Occidental.  Paris : 
L’Harmattan, 1982. p.32.
In the following quoted as: BARBIER: Le conflit du Sahara Occidental.
12 The  Dākhla peninsula protrudes about 38 km from the Atlantic coastline, enclosing the only bay 
(Río de Oro bay). 
13 Bou  Craa  is  about  100  km southeast  of  al-a Uyūn  and  is  enclosed  by  the  first  of  Morocco’s 
defensive walls.  cf. chapter 6.2.2.
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- Río de Oro (بهذلا يداو- Wādī al-Dhahab) “the gold river”14, forms the southern two-
thirds of 184,000 sq km, with the main town of Dākhla,  a seaport,  formerly Villa 
Cisneros.15
1.2. TOPOGRAPHY 
Western Sahara is a hot, vast and desolate area of about 266,000 sq km in size.16 The 
landscape is mostly flat desert with large areas of rocky or sandy surfaces. 
Physical geography of Western Sahara 17
14 RÖSSEL states  that  Portuguese  seamen,  who were  allured  with  the  gold-dust  trading  in the  15 th 
century, gave this region its name. In:  RÖSSEL, Karl: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. Westsahara: 
Der vergessene Kampf für die  Freiheit. Bad Honnef: Horlemann Verlag, 1991. p.29.
In the following quoted as: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne.
15 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.376.
16 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.23.
17 BARBIER: Le conflit du Sahara Occidental. p.11.
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The Western Sahara can be divided into three topographical areas extending from the 
Atlantic coast in the west: Dramatic cliffs border the coastline and stepped stony plains 
rise slowly from the coast towards the interior. The north east zone, from the Atlas 
Mountains up to the Zemmūr massif in the north east, is a ḥammāda (ةدامح), a rocky 
plateau with a maximum of 600 to 700m. 
The  second  zone  is  made  up  of  rivers.  In  the  north  and  west  there  are  a  few 
watercourses,  notably  the  Sāḳiyat  al-Ḥamrā’, which  gives  the northern  part  of  the 
country its name. These watercourses are often depressions where water gathers during 
the brief rainy seasons. The water quickly evaporates and never reaches the sea.18 
Thirdly, there is Río de Oro which consists of low lying plains and sand dunes in the 
south and east. Due to the very flat and permeable ground, the water accumulates in 
the subsoil forming numerous wells.19 In the southwest the highest rise of 435 m is in 
the plateau of the Adrar Soutouf plateau20.
1.3. CLIMATE 
Like the entire west of the Sahara desert, the climate of Western Sahara is harsh: 
It  is  characterized  by very low irregular  rainfall  (annual rainfall  rarely reaches 50 
mm)21, extreme variations in temperatures (during the day temperatures can reach 50˚ 
and fall below zero at night), ferocious winds and sandstorms, sparse vegetation and 
fauna and consequently extremely low settlement.22
The climate of the coastal area is more moderate and permits little agricultural land use 
(the cultivation of some crops like sorghum and barley) and produces little pasturage.23 
1.4. POPULATION 
18 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.24.
19 ibid., p.27. 
20 ibid., p.23.
21CREYAUFMÜLLER,  Wolfgang:  Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. Die materielle Kultur der Mauren,  
ihre handwerklichen Techniken und ornamentalen Grundstrukturen. Hallein: Burgfried-Verlag, 1983. 
p.16. 
In the following quoted as: CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara.
22 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.93.
23 KÖSTNER, Karin: Die innen- und außenpolitische Lage der Demokratischen Arabischen Republik  
Sahara (DARS) – unter den Bedingungen des Westsahara-Konfliktes. Freie Universitaet Berlin. 
Diplomarbeit, 1986.  p.5.
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The modern group of the Ṣaḥrāwīs is a mixed ethnic of Berber – Arabic people with 
black African influence24, speaking the Arab dialect  Ḥassāniyya25 and inhabiting the 
westernmost  Sahara  desert  within  an  area  of  today’s  Mauritania,  Mali,  Morocco, 
Algeria  and  Western  Sahara.  Nowadays  the  term  Ṣaḥrāwī is  a  synonym  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the disputed  Western  Sahara.  Recognized  regional  languages  in  the 
Western Sahara are Arabic26 and Spanish, due to a period of Spanish colonization.27  
The Western Sahara itself is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world. 
Information about the population varies widely.  According to Maurice Barbier,  the 
only count of the  Ṣaḥrāwīs was the census carried out by the Spanish authorities in 
1974. It recorded 73,497 Ṣaḥrāwīs28 and 26,126 Europeans in the territory.29 However, 
this 1974 census should be referenced with caution.30 The Ṣaḥrāwī population issue is 
sharply disputed between Morocco and the Ṣaḥrāwī nationalist movement, the Frente 
POLISARIO31 and became a key point  of  extreme contention because the present 
number of the Ṣaḥrāwīs should be identified for voting purposes in a referendum of 
self-determination of Western Sahara conducted by the UN.32
1.5. RELIGION 
24 cf. chapter 3.1 and 3.2.
25 cf. chapter 3.3.
26 cf. chapter 3.3.
27 cf. chapter 4. 
28 Thompson and Adloff state that out of this total sum of Ṣaḥrāwīs, 38,336 were men and 35,161 
were women. Of these the number of Ṣaḥrāwīs aged under 18 was 40,988 and 2,025 were over 70 
years old. 
THOMPSON,  Virginia  M./ADLOFF,  Richard: The  Western  Saharans.  Background  to  conflict. London: 
Croom Helm Ltd., 1980. p.115.
In the following quoted as: THOMPSON/ADLOFF: The Western Saharans.
29 BARBIER: Le conflit du Sahara Occidental. p.15.
30 This Spanish census is often described as “incomplete”, because (a) the large size of the Western 
Sahara and its tribes moving around freely, crossing the historically open borders with its neighboring 
countries, made it very hard to ascertain the exact number of  Ṣaḥrāwīs and (b) the census did not 
include the very large number of Ṣaḥrāwīs who happened to live outside the Western Sahara. During 
the 1960s and early 1970s, colonial repression, droughts and employment opportunities in growing 
towns like Zouerate (in today’s Mauritania) disposed many Ṣaḥrāwīs to abandon nomad life, to settle 
and live outside the territory. cf. chapter 4.3.
31 cf. chapter 5.3.
32 cf. chapter 6.3.
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The  Ṣaḥrāwīs  are  Sunnī  Muslims  of  the  Mālikī  School.  Traditionally,  religious 
practice  has  been  pragmatically  adapted  to  nomadic  life  and  local  customs  (e.g. 
praying in the open on the sand). Since the late medieval period, also various Sufi 
brotherhoods (especially  the  Ḳādiriyya) have played an important role in  religious 
practice.33 
2.  NATURAL RESOURCES
“Every  conflict,  whether  it  be  a  military  one  like  in  Iraq  or  
Afghanistan or “just” a diplomatic one, has its deeper seated reasons 
in  economic  matters.  These  real  reasons  are  often  covered  by  
cultural, religious or similar arguments, but what remains essential in 
the  end  are  the  economic  interests  of  the  parties  involved  in  the 
conflict. This is also the case in the Western Sahara conflict.”
Karin  Scheele,  member  of  the  Austrian  Socialist  Group  in  the  European 
Parliament34
There is no doubt that the question of the natural resources of Western Sahara has been 
the main reason for the interest in an area, which is mainly covered by desert and 
which is only sparsely populated. In 1974, the World Bank labeled Western Sahara as 
the  richest  territory  in  the  Maghreb  because  of  its  fishing  resources  and  huge 
phosphate deposits. In addition, it contains potentially large oil and gas reserves.35 
Ismaïl Sayeh writes that “le Sahara Occidental est en effet pour le Maghreb ce qu’est  
le Koweït pour le Golfe” – very rich in resources but low in population.36 All the 
proven as well as the prospective natural resources of Western Sahara has attracted 
the attention of others. The full potential of the area is unknown and data are limited.
For Morocco the Western Saharan natural resources are of major importance. Not just 
for the much needed employment, but also, on the one hand Morocco increases its 
share of the world phosphate market and on the other Morocco secures its control over 
33 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.32-34.
34 SCHEELE, Karin: The role of natural resources in the Western Sahara conflict. In: OLSSON, Claes (ed.): 
The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization.  Uppsala:  Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, 2006. p.30.
In the following quoted as: OLSSON (ed.): The Western Sahara Conflict.
35 PINTO LEITE, Pedro: International legality versus realpolitik. The cases of Western Sahara and East 
Timor. In : OLSSON (ed.): The Western Sahara Conflict. p.16.
36 SAYEH, Ismaïl: Les Sahraouis. Paris/Montreal: L’Harmattan, 1998. p.107-108.
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much of the North-Atlantic coast and its wealth. Furthermore, there is hope to reduce 
Morocco’s dependence on oil imports.37
Natural resources of Western Sahara38
2.1. PHOSPHATE
Bou Craa is a town in the  Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’  region, about 100 km southeast of  al-
a Uyūn, and has one of the world's largest  deposits of phosphate. Phosphate is an 
essential component in fertilizers and detergents. 
The  phosphate  resources  at  Bou  Craa  were  discovered  by  the  Spanish  geologist 
Manuel  Alia  Medina  in  1945  and  are  estimated  at  about  2,000  million  tons.39 
Brenneisen  quotes  that  in  1964  ENMINSA  geologists  estimated  the  phosphate 
resources in the entire Western Sahara at 10,000 million tons.40 
37 SHELLEY, Toby: Endgame in the Western Sahara. What future for Africa’s last colony? London: Zed 
Books Ltd, 2004. p.62. 
In the following quoted as: SHELLEY: Endgame in the Western Sahara.
38 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.125.
39 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.185.
40 In  1962 the  Empresa Nacional Minera del Sáhara (ENMINSA)  was  established as an affiliated 
company  of  the  Spanish  Instituto  Nacional  de  Industria (INI).  Compared  to  the  known  world 
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The aboveground mining of Bou Craa stretches over 250 sq km. The phosphate, mined 
from 1972, is transported over to the coast by a 96 km conveyor belt, the longest such 
belt in the world, crossing the mobile dunes on stilts.41 The average production of high-
quality processed phosphate at Bou Craa runs at around 2,4 million tons a year.42 
Bou Craa is almost entirely inhabited by employees of the Moroccan-controlled Office 
Chérifien  des  Phosphates (OCP)43,  which  provides  27% of  the  world  trade  with 
phosphate and derivates44. 
In 1976 the conveyor belt (which was built  with the help of the German company 
KRUPP GmbH) was destroyed by the Frente  POLISARIO, who wanted to stop the 
exploitation  of  Ṣaḥrāwī  property.  Up  until  1982  Morocco  could  not  continue  the 
mining of phosphate.45 
2.2. IRON ORE / MISCELLANEOUS MINEALS
Iron ore deposits on the northeastern edge of the Tīris plateau have been estimated at 
about 72 million tons.46 Those deposits are close to the huge Mauritanian iron ore 
deposits in Zouerate but the reserves of Western Sahara are said to be more and better 
in quality.47 The ore also contains titanium oxide (used in paint) and vanadium (used in 
aerospace industry).48  Speculations about  more mineral  deposits  such as uranium, 
antimony, copper, gold and manganese exist.49 
2.3. OIL AND GAS
phosphate deposits of that time, Western Sahara was (following Morocco) the second largest country 
concerning  phosphate  reserves.  In:  BRENNEISEN,  Christoph: Perspektiven  des  Sahrauischen 
Nationalismus im Rahmen der Maghrebinischen Integration. 1991.p.211. 
In the following quoted as: BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven des Sahrauischen Nationalismus im 
Rahmen der Maghrebinischen Integration.
41 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.186
42 SHELLEY: Endgame in the Western Sahara.p.71.  
43 The  OCP  is  responsible  for  managing  and  controlling  all  aspects  of  phosphate  mining  and 
beneficiation.
44 SCHEELE, Karin:  Westsahara – Ein Volk wartet auf sein Recht. Tulln: Sozialdemokratische Fraktion 
im Europäischen Parlament, 2005. p.12-14
In the following quoted as: SCHEELE, Karin: Westsahara – Ein Volk wartet auf sein Recht.
45 BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven des Sahrauischen Nationalismus im Rahmen der Maghrebinischen 
Integration. p.214.
46HODGES, Tony: Western Sahara. The Roots of a Desert War. Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 
1983. p.125. 
In the following quoted as: HODGES: Western Sahara.
47 BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven des Sahrauischen Nationalismus im Rahmen der Maghrebinischen 
Integration. p.201.
48 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.230-231.
49 BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven des Sahrauischen Nationalismus im Rahmen der Maghrebinischen 
Integration. p.200-210.
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After  reasonable exploitable  oil  fields  were  located  in  neighboring  Mauritania, 
speculation intensified on the possibility of major oil and gas resources being abundant 
in  the offshore territory of  Western Sahara.50 The area  of  interest  mainly was the 
coastal region extending from Ṭarfāya down to Cape Blanc peninsula. In the 1960s the 
explorations  for  gas  and  oil  started  and  due  to  very  limited  results  ceased 
unsuccessfully in the 1970s. In order to oversee the energy sector and to set up joint 
ventures with foreign companies, Morocco formed the state-owned Office National de 
Recherches et  d’Exploitations  Pétrolières (ONAREP)  in  1981.  The search  for  the 
commodities of oil and gas reemerged during 2000 to 2005.51 
The ONAREP awarded oil exploration permits for Western Sahara’s entire offshore 
area. Major pacts were signed with the Texas-based Kerr-McGee Cooperation and the 
French-Belgian TotalFinaElf in 2001, which immediately caused strong international 
protests  and  an  intense  political  and  legal  controversy52.  This  resulted  in  the 
abandonment  of  the  foreign  oil  companies’  activities  in  Western  Sahara  and 
investment funds withdrew their money because of humanitarian reasons. Declaring 
that  they  would  not  become  involved  in  the  territory  without  SADR permission, 
TotalFinaElf  withdrew from the  territory  in  200153,  followed  by  the  Kerr-McGee 
Cooperation in 2006.54
2.4. FISHERIES
The 1,062 km Atlantic coastline is among the richest fishing zones in the world. Still, 
the main Ṣaḥrāwī tribes traditionally were not involved in the fisheries55 and still today 
fish is usually not part of the Ṣaḥrāwīs diet. 
Spanish fishermen, based in the Canary Islands, started fishing off Western Sahara in 
the late 15th century. Spain expanded its fishing industry in the territory during the 20th 
50 SCHEELE: Westsahara – in Volk wartet auf sein Recht. p.15.
51 SCHEELE, Karin: The role of natural resources in the Western Sahara conflict. In: OLSSON (ed.): The 
Western Sahara Conflict. p.30. 
52 SHELLEY: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p.66-69. 
53 http://www.sadroilandgas.com/intro.htm [26.06.2008]
54 http://www.sadroilandgas.com/pdfs/kerr_mcgee_withdrawl.pdf  [26.06.2008]
55 First of all the territory only had a few natural harbors and the steep cliffs with its strong currents 
along the coast made fishing very hazardous. Secondly there was hardly any wood for building fishing 
boats hence it was only extremely small and poor groups that had very little livestock and depended 
for their survival on fishing. Fishing nets were cast from the shore or they waded through the water. 
PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p. 145. 
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century.56 The  world  greatest  fishing  fleets  caught  enormous  quantities  from  the 
Western Sahara waters. 
Amount of fishing in Western Saharan waters in 196957
A total catch of fish by these world fleets was estimated at 1,5 million tons annually, of 
which  about  225,000  tons  yearly  were  taken  by  Spanish  fishing  boats  until  the 
takeover of the colony by Morocco.58 Morocco continually improved the facilities for 
its fishing industry by building new ports. It furthermore increased its fleet size and the 
value added to the catch through processing. As Toby Shelley remarks, the “Western 
Saharan fisheries will become increasingly important to the Moroccan economy and  
an increasing block to consideration of a withdrawal.”59
In 1977 the Frente POLISARIO became active in launching several attacks against the 
trawlers and declared the fishing activities as violation of the territorial waters of the 
Ṣaḥrāwī Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Through the construction and extension 
of the Moroccan berms60 between 1981 and 1987, the POLISARIO was almost entirely 
cut off from the Atlantic and the attacks ended.61 
Long-term exploitations of the fish and marine animals’ reserves by foreign powers led 
to over-fishing and caused dramatic effects and resulted in the massive decline in the 
fish deposits.62
On July 2005, the EU and Morocco signed their third fishing agreement which came 
into force in March 2006 for a four year term. This agreement includes the waters of 
Western Sahara and consequently is strongly protested by the POLISARIO. 63 Morocco 
is an occupying power not an administering one and its presence in the Western Sahara 
56 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.145-146.
57 BARBIER: Le conflit du Sahara Occidental. p.24.
58 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.146.
59 SHELLEY: Endgame in the Western Sahara. p.76.
60 cf. chapter 6.2.
61 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.147-149.
62 SCHEELE: Westsahara – in Volk wartet auf sein Recht. p.14-15.
63 http://www.afrol.com/articles/16866 [26.06.2008]
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is  not  endorsed by any juridical  entitlement.  Therefore  the signing of  any fishing 
agreements with Morocco that includes the fishery resources of Western Sahara is 
illegal according to international law. 
3.  THE ṢAḤRĀWĪ PEOPLE
 
“The  Saharawi population  has  unusual  origins.  It  is  a  strange 
combination of three races,  the Berbers,  Arabs and Africans.  This  
cocktail, mixed together in the desert, makes us Muslims but also a  
very open and tolerant people, capable of accepting differences. We 
believe  for  example,  that  fundamentalism  is  an  incorrect  
interpretation of Islam and the holy book of the Koran. As far as the 
fundamental  principles  are  concerned,  Islam  is  no  different  from 
Christianity or Judaism. They all carry the same message in different  
languages. There is no ‘home of God’. God is everywhere and if you 
wish to speak to him you can do so anywhere, in your home, in the 
middle of the desert. This is why we don’t accept any Imam, nor do  
we have any compulsory sites for our holy rites. Before building a 
mosque we make sure that we first build a school, a hospital, a center  
for handicapped children. We are religious, but we are also liberal  
and tolerant.”
Omar Mansur, Minister of the Ṣaḥrāwī Arab Democratic Republic64
The  Arabic  word  ṣaḥrāwī (يوارحيص)  literally  means  “of  the  desert”.  It  should  be 
understood as “inhabitant of the Sahara”. These days the term Ṣaḥrāwī usually is used 
in reference to a person from the disputed Western Sahara territory.65  
3.1. EARLY HISTORY
The Sahara was not always a desert. This is shown by fossils and cave paintings dating 
back to around 5,000 to 2,500  B.C., when the western stretches of the Sahara were 
savannah and animals like giraffes, antelopes and elephants prevailed. Little is known 
about the people who drew these cave paintings. They are known as Bāfūr people and 
64 In:  ALEMANNO,  Stefano/Chiostrini,  Rodolfo:  Saharawi...viaggio attraverso una nazione.  Bologna: 
EMI della Coop. Sermis, 2006. p.46.
65 RÖSSEL: „Die Sahrauis hinterließen in ihrer langen Geschichte Spuren weit über die heutigen Grenzen  
hinaus. […] Trotzdem umfasst die Westsahara in ihren heutigen  Grenzen etwa das Kerngebiet, in dem  
sich über Jahrhunderte die Stammesgesellschaft der Nomaden entwickelte, die sich heute unter dem  
Oberbegriff  "Sahrauis"  zusammenfassen  lassen  –  und  die  sich  auch  selbst  so  nennen.  Das  Wort  
„Sahraui“ ist von der arabischen Sahara abgeleitet, das nichts anderes bedeutet als Wüste. Sahrauis  
sind  dementsprechend  die  „Bewohner  und  Bewohnerinnen  der  Wüste“.  Heute  tragen  nur  die  
Nomadenstämme im Westen diesen Namen.“ In: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.28.
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according  to  local  Saharan  tradition  they  were  dark-skinned  agriculturalists  and 
stockbreeders.  Progressive  desertification  over  centuries  and  the  increasingly 
inhospitable climate led to the extinction of the animals and forced human life to a 
nomadic existence. Tradition says that the  Bāfūr people began taking refuge in the 
oases or started moving southwards in search of pasture, while, during the course of 
the first millennium B.C., Berber66 nomads started migrating into the territory from the 
north.67 These first Berber migrants were Ṣanhādja, one of the two main Berber groups 
of northwest Africa68. They dominated the western stretches of the Sahara and were 
superior  with  the  use  of  horses  and  iron  against  the  remnants  of  the  Neolithic 
population. But it was not until the arrival of the camel69, that the Berbers gained the 
means  to  guarantee  their  survival  and  dominance  in  this  increasingly  arid  and 
spreading desert.70 
The Arab geographer Ibn Ḥawqal reports in the 10th century in his kitāb ṣūrat al-’arḍ (
ضرلا  ةروص  باتك) on the inhabitants of the Western Sahara: 
“[…] Between Awdaghast and Sidjilmāsa there is another tribe of the 
remote Berber tribes who have never seen a city and they only know 
the isolated desert. […] They know neither wheat nor barley nor flour  
and  among  them  [the  tribe] are  some  who only  heard  of  those  in  
stories. Their nourishment is milk products and sometimes meat. They 
66 The term Berber has negative connotations. According to Mohamed Tilmatine it derives from the 
Greek barbaroi and respectively from the Latin word barbarus. The Arabic root  ب-ر-ب-ر “barbaric,  
uncivilized” approximates the Greek and Latin meaning. The Berbers refer to themselves as Imazighen 
(Sg.  Amazigh).  The  Encyclopédie  Berbère  translates  amazigh as  “homme libre,  noble”.  TILMATINE, 
Mohamed: Zum Wortpaar “Berber” – “Amazigh”. Ein Beitrag zur terminologischen Vereinheitlichung 
und Klärung eines nicht lexikalischen Terminus. p.18-19. In:  Muttersprache,  Vol.1 (1995),  p.18-23. 
And:  Encyclopédie Berbère,  IV,  s.v.  AmaziƔ  (Amazigh).  And:  WEHR,  Hans  [ed.]:  A dictionary of  
modern written Arabic. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1952. s.r. b-r-b-r.
67 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.3.
68 During the eight and ninth century the Ṣanhādja and the Zanāta were the two main Berber groups 
of northwest Africa. The Zanāta, despite their nomadic traditions, controlled the main oases and the 
trading  centers  of the northern fringes of the desert,  while the  Ṣanhādja  lived in the south,  in the 
desert itself, and were camel-herding nomads. EI² XI, s.v. Zanāta.
69 PAZZANITA/HODGES describe the importance of the camel:  “In traditional nomadic society, the camel  
was the axis of the pastoral economy […]. With a stomach capacity of up to 245 liters, the camel can go  
for days without drinking – five weeks in autumn or winter if pastures are good. Its ability to travel at  
least 69 km a day, and in exceptional cases as much as 120 km, allows it to take the best advantage of  
the dispersed an limited pastures. As a pack animal, the camel can take loads of up to 120-150 kg, 
making it ideal for long-distance trade in the days of trans-Saharan caravans. It was also a military 
asset, being well suited for the ghazzi. Camel’s milk was the foundation of the nomad’s diet, the females  
being able to produce usually about 5-7 liters a day […].The animal’s hair was used to weave the 
khaima, the  Saharawi tent.  Finally,  the camel was traditionally a means of exchange and the main 
“export” of the nomads, beings sold for cereals, sugar, tea, cloth, and other necessities in the markets  
of southern Morocco […].” In: PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p. 253. 
70 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.31. 
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are persevering and strong like no one else. They have a ruler who  
reigns and guides them and whom the Ṣanhādja and the other people 
of this land esteem because they seize this path. They are fearless and 
courageous, chivalric cameleers, agile runners, strong and they have 
knowledge of the conditions of the desert, its shapes, the guidance in 
it  and  of  the  leading  to  its  watering  places  through  ledge  and 
memorizing. […] Except for their eyes, they [a few other Berber tribes are 
earlier mentioned in this text] and the Ṣanhādja never show anything of  
their face which they veil, growing up like this. And they claim that  
the mouth is the evil that needs covering like the private parts because 
what comes out of it [the mouth] is worse to them than what comes out  
of the private parts. They impose taxes on the commodity of those who  
pass them, for each camel and loading, and of those who return from 
the balad al-sūdān with gold dust. In this lies the base of some of their  
concerns.  […]  All  are  allowed  [to  use] the  land  as  pasture,  for 
plantation and the water for watering the camels and the livestock.  
And a lot  of  them have  nice  colors,  excellent  advantages  in  their  
character and flawless bodies until you go southwards where their 
colors and complexions differ.”71
The camel  arrived from the eastern Arab countries  in about the first  century  B.C., 
revolutionizing the traditional trade routes of North Africa. The Berbers of the Western 
Sahara participated in the caravan trade and controlled the trade routes through the 
desert, but the Ṣanhādja were excluded from the main market towns like Sidjilmāsa (
ةساملجييس -  in  today’s  southeastern  Morocco)  and  Awdaghast (تييسغدوأ -  in  today’s 
southern Mauritania). Besides salt, gold and ivory, also slaves from the bilād al-sūdān 
“land of the black”, (as the Arabs called all African regions south of the Sahara) were 
trading goods between North Africa and West Africa. Surrounded by the Zanāta and 
the Soninke72, the Ṣanhādja for the time being, had been barred from breaking out of 
their harsh desert to the more pleasing pasturelands in the north and south.73 
After the first Arab expeditions to the Maghreb, Islam was introduced during the 7th 
and 8th centuries and the new faith achieved quick expansion. The Islamization of the 
Berber tribes brought about fundamental changes. The introduction of Islam provided 
commandments  and  laws,  which  went  beyond  tribal  rules  and  therefore  was  an 
71 IBN ḤAWQAL,  Abū l-Qāsim an-Naṣībī:  kitāb  ṣūrat al-’arḍ.  Ed. J.H. Kramers:  Opus geographicum 
auctore Ibn Ḥaukal … titulus est “Liber imaginis terrae”. Lugundi Batavorum 1873, Nachdruck 1967 
(Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, Pars 2). p.101-103
72 The Soninke were the founders of the ancient empire of Ghāna, which was located in what are now 
southeastern Mauritania, western Mali and eastern Senegal. (see map on p.26) 
73 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.31. 
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essential  basis  for  the development  of  a  common identity  of  the various  nomadic 
tribes. Nevertheless, the Berbers were only superficially Islamized and many religious 
rites were still influenced by superstition and animism.74 According to Ibn  Khaldūn, 
around 1036 the great leader  Yaḥyā b. Ibrāhīm al-Gudālī went on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca and became ashamed of his people’s shallow knowledge of Islam and the level 
of illiteracy and ignorance of the Koran. He invited o Abdallāh b. Yāsīn, a very strict 
Mālikī of the southern Moroccan province of Sūs, to preach to the Ṣanhādja tribes. Ibn 
Yāsīn (and afterwards  Abū Bakr  b.  A Umar)  managed to  recruit  a  loyal  army of 
followers and subsequently launched a holy war, in order to eliminate the superstitious 
beliefs  and  practices  still  prevailing  among  the  nomads.75 The  Ṣanhādja tribes 
(especially the  Ṣanhādja sub-tribes Lamtūna, Gudāla  and Massūfa)76 rallied under a 
religious banner and began raiding their historic main rivals, the Zanāta Berbers to the 
north and the black Soninke to the south, and finally became known in European usage 
as “the Almoravids”77. By seizing the main trading towns of the time, Sidjilmāsa and 
Awdaghast, they achieved a double victory and became masters of the Saharan trading 
routes in the middle of the 11th century.78
During the Almoravid period the Islam, of an orthodox Sunnī stamp, became firmly 
implanted in the nomad’s culture.  The Almoravids preached a strict  observance of 
Islamic law and the waging of war against the infidel. They marched north and by 
1069 succeeded in conquering Morocco and subsequently Muslim Spain. In 1110, at 
the height  of  their  power,  the Almoravid  Empire  stretched from Saragossa  to  the 
Senegal River. In the following century the empire collapsed due to tribal rivalry and 
resumption of the Christian reconquista in Spain.79
74 TYDECKS,  Reinhard:  Der  Maghreb.  Traditionelle  Nomadenkultur,  Geschichte  des  Kolonialismus,  
Krieg um die Westsahara. Unkel/Rh.: Horlemann, 1991. p.19-20.
75 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.33-34.
76 EI² VII, s.v. al-Murābiṭūn.
77 The Hispanicized term Almorávides derives from the Arabic al-Murābiṭūn (نوطبارملا). The EI² states: 
“This word was once assumed to be derived from a type of “warrior-monk” who inhabited a ribāṭ, a 
fortified  convent  on  the  frontiers  of  Islam […]  However,  the  Saharan  Murābiṭūn  may  well  have 
regarded  their  name  as  metaphorical,  a  spiritual  discipline  rather  than  a  literal  toponymic  or  
geographical nomenclature attached to a convent or a retreat […].” EI² VII, s.v. al-Murābiṭūn. 
78 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.32-33.
79 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.6-7. 
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In 1203 the Soninke recaptured the Ghāna Empire.80 
Extent of the Almoravid Empire 81
3.2. GRADUAL ARABIZATION 
The Arab invasions in the 7th and 8th centuries resulted in the Islamization of the Berber 
people, but the Ṣanhādja tribes stuck to their traditions, their culture and their Berber 
language. Very few Arabs had settled in the Maghreb and Arabic was hardly spoken 
outside the cities. Further south, the less the influence of Arab culture prevailed.82 It 
was not until the 11th century that the Arabization began, when Arab Bedouin tribes 
started a series of invasions in the Maghreb. Neither the Banū Hilāl ( لله وينب ) nor the 
Banū Sulaym (ميلس  وسنب)  reached as far  as the western Sahara.  It  was the bellicose 
MaMḳil (لقعم), a Bedouin tribe that (presumably) originated in Yemen, who penetrated 
the western Sahara in the early 13th century, reaching the oases of the Dar a valley83 
and  the  Atlantic  coast.  Migrating  westwards  via  Egypt,  the  MaMḳil were  badly 
80 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.28.
81 BOVILL, E.W.: The Golden Trade of the Moors. 2nd edition. Oxford: University Press, 1970. p.75. 
82 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.24. 
In the following quoted as: CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara.
83 Dar a  is  the  name  of  a  river  of  south  Morocco  and  concurrently  gives  name  to  a  Moroccan 
province which stretches along the banks of this river. EI² II, s.v. DarE a.
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received by the Zanāta Berbers, who were controlling the northwestern fringes of the 
Sahara. Among the MaMḳil tribes pushed out of the territory, were the Banū Ḥassān (
ناسسح وينب ).84 From the  end  of  the  13th century,  the  Banū  Ḥassān began  migrating 
southwards from the Dars a valley into the western Sahara and established themselves 
in the territory.85 They subjected all the Berber tribes of the region and made some pay 
tributes, others were forced to fight with them.86 
Between the 15th and 17th centuries the Banū Ḥassān extended their authority over most 
of today’s Mauritania and the Western Sahara. Over the centuries, despite of sustained 
resistance and long lasting battles, the Banū Ḥassān gradually fused and intermarried 
with the  Ṣanhādja tribes, giving birth to a new Arabic-speaking people with mixed 
ethnic origins – the Moors87. In the course of time the Berber language almost entirely 
disappeared as did the Berber practice of veiling their faces.88  
In simple terms, the social  anthropology of today’s  Ṣaḥrāwīs consequently can be 
traced back to a mergence of Arabs, Berbers and black Africans (due to miscegenation 
with slaves and their descendants).89
Until the middle of the 20th century the Moors lived as pastoral nomads in the trāb al-
bīḍān “the land of the whites”, (in contrast to the land of the black Africans to their 
south). Apart from the Atlantic coastline, there were no defined borders: The trāb al-
bīḍān covered a huge territory of the Sahara:  from the Dar a River in  the north 
(today’s south Morocco) to the banks of the Senegal River and the bend of the Niger, 
84SEIWERT,  Wolf-Dieter:  Maurische  Chronik.  Die  Völker  der  Westsahara  in  historischen 
Überlieferungen und Berichten. p.61-63.
85 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.35.
86 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.26.
87 The term Moor has derivatives in almost all Western European languages. It probably derives from 
the Semitic mahurím, “people of the west”, and passed into the Greek mauros and the Latin maurus. 
The  Christian Spaniards  e.g.  used the term  moros to name the Muslim conquerors  of  Berber  and 
Arabic parentage.  EI² VII, s.v. Moors.  
In  this  paper  Moor  is  used  to  refer  to  an  ethnic  group,  to  a  collection  of  tribes,  speaking  the 
Ḥassāniyya Arabic dialect, who are of Arab-Berber heritage, fair-complexioned and  who mainly live 
in Mauritania, Western Sahara, southern Morocco, western Algeria, Mali and surrounding territories.  
88 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.31. 
89 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.8.
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and from the Atlantic coast to a series of almost impenetrable dune zones in the inner 
Sahara (what is now eastern Mauritania).90
The Ṣaḥrāwīs called themselves “sons of the clouds” for their life followed the pattern 
of  seasonal  transhumance  in  the  constant  search  of  water,  pastures  and  other 
necessities such as salt.91 
3.3. LANGUAGE 
The Banū Ḥassān spoke Ḥassāniyya (ةيناسح), an Arabic dialect which is structurally and 
phonetically  pretty  close  to  Ancient  Arabic92.  By  the  19th century  at  the  latest, 
Ḥassāniyya was  adopted  by  nearly  all  the  tribes  of  predominately  Ṣanhādja.  The 
dialect has evolved little, some words from the Berber dialect and of Sudanese origin 
(especially for naming local features like plants, animals or geographical terms etc.) 
were absorbed.93 Nowadays Ḥassāniyya is spoken in the Western Sahara, Mauritania, 
southern Morocco, southwestern Algeria and parts of Mali.94  
3.4. TRIBALISM95 
The tribe (ةليبق – ḳabīla) was the historical basis of the social and political organization 
among the Ṣaḥrāwī society and these tribal structures basically remained up to the 20th 
century. Hodges states that “there was a very strong sense of agnatic solidarity […],  
because the tribe constituted the ultimate source of security for the individual in the 
90 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.8-9.
91 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.4.
92 Ḥassāniyya is a Bedouin dialect and despite the influence of the substrate, it has more in common 
with eastern Arabic dialects than with the Maghreb ones. Ḥassāniyya is a relatively conservative 
language and its main characteristics are: preservation of the interdental consonants, genitive 
conjunction without preposition and no use of particles in order to express the present time. For more 
information see: VERSTEEGH, Kees [ed.]: Encyclopedia of Arabic language and linguistics. Volume II. 
Eg-Lan. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007. s.v. Ḥassāniyya Arabic, p.240-250.
93 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.138.
94 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.216-217.
95 Tribalism in the Western Sahara is a very complex issue and the process of interaction between 
tribes of Ṣanhādja and MaMḳil origin is a very complicated one. The analysis of the social system as 
well is a very complex and difficult scientific task and would go beyond the scope of this paper. In the 
following only a very simplified overview will be given. For more details about social  and ethnic 
hierarchy  within the Western  Saharan  tribes,  see:  HODGES,  Tony:  Western Sahara.  The Roots of  a  
Desert War. Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983.
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anarchic world of the desert, where raiding between tribes was frequent.”96 Today’s 
known tribal structures and the stratified social structures developed after centuries of 
wars, alliances, tribal fusions and migrations between the 17th and 19th century.97 Every 
Ṣaḥrāwī ḳabīla claimed to have a founder and from this ancestor the members of the 
tribe descended. The tribe was subdivided into a series of sub-tribes (ذيخف -  fakh  dh  ), 
each usually founded by a close descendant of the founder of the qabīla and in turn 
those sub-tribes were segmented into fractions.98 
The fusion between the Ṣanhādja and the Banū Ḥassān gave rise to a stratified social 
system that characterized the nomadic society of Western Sahara and Mauritania99. 
Within the nomads tribes and groups of acutely different status and prestige existed: 
3.4.1. The free and notables – ahl mdāfia  and ahl kutub
The  ahl mdāfia  “people of the gun”, the cast of the warriors, were powerful tribes 
who called themselves  w arab or  ḥassān100 and enjoyed the highest  prestige.  They 
exacted payment for protection from the less powerful ones. Most of the warrior tribes 
can  verify  their  Arab  ancestry  (e.g.  the  Ūlād  Delīm).  Regular  ghazwas101 “raids, 
incursions”, against other tribes guaranteed their wealth.102 
Some  of  the  Ṣanhādja gave  up  the  sword  for  the  book,  becoming  zwāya tribes 
(religious brotherhoods), who dedicated their life to religious study and teaching. The 
ahl  kutub “people  of  the book”,  claimed  to  be  direct  descendants  of  the  Prophet 
96 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.10.
97 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.31.
98 For a list of Ṣaḥrāwī tribes/subtribes/fractions, see Appendix I.
99 RUF, Urs Peter:  Mobile Sesshafte. Sedentarisierung und Geschichte der Nomaden in Mauretanien. 
Saarbrücken: Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik, 1995. p.21. 
In the following quoted as: RUF: Mobile Sesshafte.
100 SCHRAMM: Die Westsahara. p.94.
101 PAZZANITA/HODGES: “[...] Raiding was such an intrinsic part of traditional Sahrawi society that it  
sometimes ranked in economic importance with livestock herding and trading. The methods, rules, and 
obligations associated with it were virtually institutionalized. The harsh desert environment and the 
pastoral nomadic way of life of the Sahrawis encouraged raiding. There was no supratribal state to 
maintain order.[…] The very practice of nomadic livestock-raising provided a ready supply of animals 
suited to military use (camels) and provided skills and techniques (knowledge of terrain, riding sklills,  
great mobility) of obvious military application. Finally, the competition between groups for livestock 
engouraged violence, though the almost endless raiding could ruin as well as enrich those that  
practiced it. Saharawi society in general was militarized by the ghazi.”  PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical  
Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.179.
102 The object of a ghazw (colloquial ghazu) was the acquisition of booty, namely camels, which could 
give the only economic security in an harsh desert area. EI² II, s.v. Ghazw.
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Muḥammad to enhance their religious credibility. But since most of the ahl kutub were 
actually  of  Berber  origin,  they  almost  invariably  manipulated  their  genealogy  by 
intermarrying or through entering into contracts, in order to verify their parentage from 
the Prophet.103 The high status of the warriors and scribes is mainly ascribed to the 
tough survival conditions of the desert, where you needed a gun and trust in God.104
3.4.2. The dependents – znāga and a abīd
The znāga were dependent tribes and they were forced to pay tribute (ةمرح - ḥurma) to 
powerful warrior tribes. These tributes usually were a goat or a sheep and in return the 
warriors protected the znāga against other tribes.105 
The first T abīd “slaves”, were of the Bāfūr people and later slaves were acquired of 
the black African countries  south of  the Sahara,  either  on the caravan markets  or 
through raids. The status of a slave106 was hereditary and therefore many generations of 
one slave family stayed with the same nomadic family and hence formed part of the 
tribe. Occasionally slaves were freed who were known as ḥarāṭīn.107 
3.4.3. The scorned
103 HODGES: Western Sahara .p.44.
104 ibid., p.43. 
105 ibid., p.10.
106 Creyaufmüller in „Völker der Sahara –Mauren und Tuareg“ about the term  slave in the Western 
Sahara:  “Dieses  Wort  hat  vielfach  einen  Bedeutungsinhalt,  der  harte  Unterdrückung,  körperliche  
Misshandlung und  Schlimmeres  einschließt,  so  wie  es  von  den  Sklaven  in  Amerika  immer  wieder  
berichtet wird. In den saharischen Gesellschaften kommt dem Sklavenstatus eine andere Bedeutung zu.  
Zwar konnte ein Sklave gekauft und verkauft werden (was selten vorkam) und durfte auch keinen oder  
nur  geringen  Besitz  erwerben,  musste  anderseits  aber  von  seinem  Herrn  unterhalten  werden;  
Sklavenstatus schließt automatisch die Altersfürsorge, die der Herr zu geben hat, mit ein. Ebenso bekam  
jeder Sklave nach einem abgeschlossenen Handel, z.B. Kamelverkauf, einen gewissen Erlös ab in Form  
neuer Kleidung, Tee oder ähnlichem. Wurde ein Sklave geschlagen oder anderweitig misshandelte,  
konnte er – ohne Strafe befürchten zu müssen – seinen alten Herren verlassen und sich einem anderen 
unterordnen. „Sklave“ und „Herr“ standen immer in einem wechselseitigen Abhängigkeitsverhältnis,  
was dazu führte, dass viele Sklaven auch nach ihrer Befreiung bei ihren alten Herren blieben.“ Cited 
in: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.46-47. 
107 The exact etymology of  ḥarṭānī (pl.  ḥarāṭīn) is not known. Creyaufmüller suggests that it derives 
from the Arabic ḥurr “free”, and thānī “second”.  CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara.  
p.58. The EI² also mentions this explanation as ḥurr thānī “men who had become free, a freedman”, 
but states it as unfounded. EI² III, s.v. ḥarṭānī.
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At the bottom of the social scale were groups laboring in demeaning occupations like 
mm allamīn “craftsmen”,  īggāwan “bards”,  imwragen “fishermen”,  and  nmādi 
“hunters”. These groups rarely formed tribes of their own.108  
It is important to note, that the above-mentioned order must not be regarded as a rigid 
system. Shifting took place, i.e. prestige could increase but also decrease through e.g. a 
marriage in a new tribe.109 Creyaufmüller writes about this nomadic social order: 
“Dies alles […] ist zusammen zu denken und darüber hinaus flexibel,  
lebendig,  dynamisch  zu  denken,  mit  Auf-  und  Abstiegen,  
Umschichtungen,  ruhiger  während  mancher  Perioden,  heftiger 
bewegt in anderen Zeiten. Denkt man dies alles bewegt und netzartig  
verwoben,  hat  man  als  Außenstehender  einigermaßen  reale  
Vorstellungen  von  der  maurischen  oder  westsaharischen 
Gesellschafts-  und  Sozialordnung.  Erst  dann  läuft  man  nicht  in  
Gefahr,  die  als  hierarchisch  beschriebene  Ordnung  als  starres  
Schema aufzufassen,  was  es  weder  in  horizontaler  noch  vertikale  
Gliederung jemals war […].“110
108SCHRAMM,  Josef:  Die  Westsahara.  Geographische  Betrachtungen  einer  mehrrassischen 
Gesellschaftsordnung  der  westsaharischen  Viehzüchter  in  der  Berührung  mit  der  modernen 
Industriegesellschaft. Freilassing: Pannonia-Verlag, 1969. p.101-104.
In the following quoted as: SCHRAMM: Die Westsahara.
109 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.43.
110 CREYAUFMÜLLER: Nomadenkultur in der Westsahara. p.55. 
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The tribal regions of the Western Sahara’s nomads111
The biggest and most significant tribes were the ahl mdāfia  tribes of the Ūlād Delīm 
(in the south and at the coast), the Regueibat (in the center of the Western Sahara) and 
the Tekna112 (in the north).113 
According to the Spanish census of 1974, 37,972 out of 73,497 officially registered 
Ṣaḥrāwīs were Regueibat, followed by about 11,530 Tekna and third is the Ūlād Delīm 
with 5,382 people.114 
As a result of increased employment opportunities in the Spanish colony’s cities,  the 
succession of droughts, armed conflicts and refugee movements, nomadism had ended 
111 MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.127.
112 MERCER reports  that  up to the 19th century the Ūlād Delīm was one  of the most  important  and 
dominant  warrior  tribes.  They  claim descent  from Delīm,  who was  one  of  the  sons’  Ḥassān (the 
assumed ancestor of all the Banū Ḥassān), and therefore are probably among the purest Arabs of the 
Sahel. In contrast, the tribes of the Tekna on the northwestern borders of the Sahara seem to be the 
product of a fusion of Banū Ḥassān and Ṣanhādja peoples and the Tekna partly still speak the Berber 
language. In: MERCER: Spanish Sahara. p.125.
113 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.52-54.
114 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.356.
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completely by the late 1970s and the Ṣaḥrāwīs had settled either in the few towns of 
Western Sahara itself or in the neighboring countries.115 
3.5. POLITICAL POWER – THE DJ  AMĀA A
The Ḥassāniyya Ṣaḥrāwī society had no stable and centralized governing authority.116 
The conditions of the vast and harsh desert, in which small nomadic groups had to 
wander about over huge areas in search of pastures, was not adjuvant to the rise of 
complex state structures.117 The  Ṣaḥrāwīs’ prime loyalties  hence were to the tribe, 
fraction  and  family.  Lawmaking,  conflict  resolution  (e.g.  responsibility  for  blood 
debts), political and central decision-making (e.g. finding marrying partners) within 
the tribe was carried out by the djamāa a (ةعامج), a gathering composed of elders and 
the most  respectable  persons  of  the  tribe.  In  other  words  it  acted  as  a  combined 
executive, legislative and judicial authority. The djamāa a elected the group’s leader (
خييش - shaykh), appointed the judge (ضاق - ḳāḍī) and established its own body of law (
فرع- - urf): Based on the sharīī a (ةعيرش), Berber customs as well as Arab traditions 
were incorporated. This collective decision making through the djamāa a shows, that 
Ṣaḥrāwī society was quite democratic, although women, slaves and members of the 
scorned caste were excluded. The decisions of the djamāa a were obligatory for every 
individual.  Anyone  who  refused  to  obey  its  decision  could  be  expelled  from the 
tribe.118
For deliberating on topics such as the tribe’s defense, especially in times of war or 
raids, the aït arbaï ayn “council of forty”, would gather. This was a war council, an 
115 cf. chapter 4.3.
116 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.60. 
117 GRANCY, Christine de: Die Sahraouis. Söhne und Töchter der Wolken. Von der stillen Revolution der  
Polisario. Ein photographischer Essay. Nördlingen : Greno Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H., 1987. p.121.
118 CLAUSEN, Ursel: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. Hamburg: Verbund Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-
Institut, 1978. p.12.
In the following quoted as: CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara.
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assembly of various tribes, sub-tribes and fractions in order to organize the community 
against foreign invasion or other supratribal concerns. 
Except for the brief unifying of the Almoravid movement, no supratribal authority 
existed  to  regulate  the  relations  between  the  wandering  and independent Ṣaḥrāwī 
tribes.119  
4. EUROPEAN COLONIZATION 
4.1. SPANIARDS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA 
European explorers  first  emerged at  the Western Sahara coast  in  the 14th and 15th 
centuries.  It was Portugal and Spain, the two great mercantile powers back then, who 
set sail for the dreaded mare tenebrosum120 (sea of darkness), as the coast south of the 
Cape Boujdour 121 was known.122  
During the late 19th century France was the major colonial power in Africa and had 
already conquered most  of  North and largely  West  Africa.  This  included Algeria, 
119 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.14-15. 
120 At  that  time Cape Boujdour  had  been  the  southernmost  landmark  on  the  Saharan  coast  to  be 
charted by medieval European seamen and cartographers. The Encyclopaedia Britannica notes that the 
Cape's Arabic name is Abū Khaṭar (رطخ وبا), “the father of danger”. Encyclopaedia Britannica, online 
version www.britannica.com, s.v. Cape Bojador. [26.05.2008]
121 Spain’s and Portugal’s attention on the African continent  back then was mainly driven by their 
interest in slaves and gold. BARBIER: Le conflit du Sahara Occidental. p.31-32.
122 HODGES, Tony: Western Sahara.p.17.
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Mauritania  and from 1912 Morocco.  France  sought  to  extend its  possessions  and 
wanted to encroach upon the interior of the Sahara.123 Spain feared that it would lose 
its control of North Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla)  and the Canary Islands and that 
another European power might gain control of this coast so close to these islands. 
Hence, at the instigation of the Sociedad Española de Africanistas y Colonistas and the 
Compania Comercial Hispano-Africana, Spain set up a trading and military post at 
Dākhla,  which  was  to  become  the  settlement  of  Villa  Cisneros  and  declared  a 
‘protectorate’ over the costal region from Boujdour to Cape Blanc in 1884.124 This was 
ratified at the Berlin Conference in the following year, where Africa was carved up 
among the European powers, and Spain was given jurisdiction over the coastal area of 
present-day Western Sahara.125 The borders of the Spanish colony were subsequently 
extended and defined by three partly secret conventions between France and Spain in 
1900, 1904 and 1912 and gave Spain full sovereignty over Río de Oro and Sāḳiyat al-
Ḥamrā’. The conventions furthermore specified that the territory around Ṭarfāya (the 
so-called Tekna Zone126) was part of Spain’s protectorate zone in Morocco.127 
123 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.82.
124 ibid., p.84.
125 ibid.
126 This denomination derives from the fact that the area around Ṭarfāya traditionally formed part of 
the  nomadic  region  of  the  Ṣaḥrāwīs  and  was  predominately  inhabited  by  the  Tekna  tribe. 
PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.426.
127 HODGES, Tony: Western Sahara. p.47-48.
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The demarcation of the borders of Western Sahara128
4.2. MĀ’ AL-- AYNAYN AND THE DJ  IHĀD AGAINST THE INFIDELS  
Entering the area in 1884, Spain was immediately challenged by heavy resistance from 
the indigenous Ṣaḥrāwī tribes and attempts to actually conquer the Western Saharan 
inland failed at nomadic resistance.129 The political loyalty of these populations was 
first and foremost to their respective tribes and supratribal allegiances.130 The nomadic 
lifestyle made direct control over the territories hard to achieve, as did the conditions 
of the harsh desert itself.131 Until 1934 Spain widely forwent an “active” colonization 
and thus the interior of the Western Sahara fighters offered the possibility to retreat 
and reorganize the resistance.132 The new arbitrary drawn borders also affected the 
surrounding countries  of  Morocco,  Algeria  and Mauritania.  Mā’ al-s Aynayn133,  a 
Mauritania-born  religious  and  political  leader,  felt  increasingly  disturbed  by  the 
European encroachment on the Atlantic coast of the Sahara, which he viewed both as 
an intrusion into the desert by hostile Europeans and as a Christian assault on Islam. 
Determined by his  religious  zeal,  Mā’ al-D Aynayn began agitating for resistance, 
allied various tribes and launched a djihād against the colonial powers France and, to a 
lesser degree, against Spain.134 Furthermore he built Ṣmāra, the first city in the Sahara, 
as  a  cultural,  religious  and political  center.135 After  his  death  in  1910,  a  wave of 
uprisings continued under his sons Aḥmad al-Hiba and Murabbīh Rabbuh.136 In 1912 
128 Firstly,  France  and  Spain  agreed  upon  the  southern  border,  which  still  conforms  to  today’s 
boundary line. The eastern border followed. The weird bend in the southeast of Western Sahara is 
because France persisted on keeping the lucrative salt stock in Idjil. With the next two treaties the 
northern border was defined. HODGES: Western Sahara.p.46.
129 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.85.
130 cf. chapter 3.5.
131 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.85.
132 ibid., p.90.
133 Mā’ al- Aynayn “water of both eyes”, was born in 1831 and his real name was Muḥammad al-
Muṣṭafā. As to the significance of his sobriquet, uncertainty remains. EI² V, s.v. Mā’ al-a Aynayn.
134 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.55-65. 
135 EI² V, s.v. Mā’ al- Aynayn
136 ibid.
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France defeated this resistance movement in Marrakesh and the rebels finally retreated 
into the south, where resistance continued.137 
With the persistent  Ṣaḥrāwī resistance,  France intensified its  military  campaign in 
Mauritania and also made many incursions into Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’. France put pressure 
on Spain to stop allowing its  Saharan territory to be used as a sanctuary by anti-
colonial  forces  staging  ghazwas  against  French  positions  in  the  neighboring 
territories.138 Only with strong French military assistance, Spain, for the first time, was 
finally able to penetrate into the interior of present-day Western Sahara, subdue it and 
gain military control of “its” colony from the 1930s.139
4.3. SPAIN PENETRATES THE INTERIOR 
As already mentioned, Spain’s control in the Western Sahara was still confined to a 
limited presence along its three coastal staging posts at Villa Cisneros, La Guera and 
Ṭarfāya until 1934140. But through the abatement of resistance by the end of this year, 
Spain was able to strengthen its position in the territory and finally occupied Ṣmāra.141 
In 1919, only about 460 Europeans lived in the Western Sahara and this number did 
not increase until the 1930s following an economic upturn.142 
However, the Spanish attempts to settle the nomads in those small colonial positions 
failed at the first. The Ṣaḥrāwīs pursued to live as nomads in their traditions, and this 
137GNIDIL, Abdelfadil:  Die  völkerrechtliche  Lage  der  ehemaligen  Spanischen  Sahara. Inaugural-
Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Juristischen Fakultät der Eberhard-Karls-Universität 
Tübingen, 1987. p.22. 
In the following quoted as: GNIDIL: Die völkerrechtliche Lage der ehemaligen Spanischen Sahara.
138 GNIDIL: Die völkerrechtliche Lage der ehemaligen Spanischen Sahara. p.2-3. 
139 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.90.
140 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.7-8.
141 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.114.
142 BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven  des  Sahrauischen  Nationalismus  im  Rahmen  der  Maghrebinischen  
Integration. p.95-97. 
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didn’t change until the 1960s.143 Nevertheless, the Ṣaḥrāwīs didn’t welcome the quite 
unobtrusive attitude of the Spaniards. One  Ṣaḥrāwī told the Spanish anthropologist 
Julio Caro Baroja in the 1960s: “All are znaga now. That is to say, we all now have to  
adjust ourselves to laws which are not ours, put up with the control of arms, property  
and so on, imposed by more powerful people. The only man of the gun now is the  
soldier of the government.”144 
The opportunity to fight for freedom soon presented itself.
In the 1960s the whole Maghreb was characterized by strong independent movements 
and  most  of  the  British  and  French  colonies  in  Africa  had  already  gained 
independence.  In response to colonialism, the  Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 
had been struggling for  independence  in  Algeria  since 1954,  while  the  Armée de 
Libération (AL)  did  the  same  in  Morocco  from  1955.145 These  independence 
movements, especially the AL146, inspired many Ṣaḥrāwīs to take up arms against the 
Spanish and French colonial powers. From mid-1956 the Ṣaḥrāwīs began to enroll in 
the Moroccan Armée de Libération who provided the new members147 with leadership 
and arms and soon the Ṣaḥrāwīs formed their own guerilla wing of the AL.148 At this 
stage, however, it was hardly a nationalist movement, as the main concern was to drive 
out foreign rule in the region rather than to build a nation. The strategy of this guerilla 
143 Hodges states that “In many respects the Sahrawis’ way of life continued as it had for hundreds of  
years. Very few Sahrawis came to live in the small Spanish settlements before the sixties. The vast  
majority remained nomads and, as such, they were more or less left to their own devices by the Spanish,  
who,  despite  establishing  garrisons in the interior  in 1934,  could not  hope to bring the dispersed 
nomadic communities under their direct administrative control and made no attempt to tax them. The  
Sahrawi fractions continued to administer their own affairs through their traditional djemaas and to  
apply their own codes of justice, the customary orf law and the koranic sharia.” In:  HODGES:  Western 
Sahara. p.70.
144 Quoted in: CARO BAROJA, Julio: Estudios Saharianos. And cited by: HODGES: Western Sahara. p.71.   
145 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.73.
146 The AL remained even after Morocco achieved independence in 1956. Rössel defines the reasons: 
„Der  nationale  Widerstandsrat  der  „Befreiungsarmee“  kritisierte  die  Kompromissbereitschaft  des  
neugekürten  marokkanischen  Herrschers(Mohammed  V)   gegenüber  Frankreich.“  Furthermore  he 
writes: „Das von den französischen Siedlern, den Colons, zuvor beschlagnahmte Land wurde nicht – 
wie im Unabhängigkeitskampf versprochen – enteignet und an Marokkaner verteilt.  Darüber hinaus  
beschwerte  sich die  „Befreiungsarmee,  dass der  neue Koenig Mohammed V der weiteren  Präsenz  
französischer Truppen im Land zugestimmt hatte[…].“ In: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne.  
p.118.
147 It was especially members of the Regueibat and Tekna tribes who fought in the AL against the 
colonial presence. RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.118.
148 ibid.
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movement was to primarily drive the French out of Mauritania and Algeria because 
without France by its side, Spain would not be able to continue holding the fort.149 
This guerilla movement was the most serious challenge to the Spanish authorities in 
the Western Sahara since the early years of the colony. Spain was forced to withdraw 
all its garrisons from the interior, including Ṣmāra, in order to defend a few strategic 
enclaves  on the coast150 until  the arrival  of  reinforcements and the launching of  a 
Franco-Spanish  counterinsurgency  campaign.151 In  February  1958  the  revolt  was 
finally put down by a joint offensive, known as Operation Ouragan.152
According to Hodges, 5,000 French troops and 9,000 Spanish troops backed by scores 
of aircraft, staged a counterinsurgency sweep through Western Sahara defeating the 
guerilla forces whose remnants fled north.153     
The crushing of the  Ṣaḥrāwī AL became possible with the complicity of the newly 
independent Moroccan government who helped to cut off the movement’s source of 
supplies and munitions from southern Morocco and who disarmed and disbanded the 
remnants of the guerilla movement.154 As a result of its help in fighting the Ṣaḥrāwī 
rebels,  Spain  handed the Tekna Zone over  to  Morocco through the  Agreement  of  
Cintra in April 1958.155 For more than a decade armed Ṣaḥrāwī resistance was laid to 
rest and the next guerilla attacks were not to come until 1973, after the founding of the 
Frente POLISARIO.
The brutality used by the colonial powers in shattering the resistance156 led to the first 
major refugee movement. Several thousand Ṣaḥrāwīs settled at that time in southern 
Morocco to either escape the fighting or to join the guerilla’s rear bases. Morocco 
announced in March 1958, that it had received 13,000 Ṣaḥrāwī refugees.157 
149 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.118.
150 CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.11.
151 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.117.
152 ibid., p.120. 
153 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.80.
154 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.121.
155 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.121.
156 According  to  Rössel,  the  Spanish  and  French  troops  empoisoned  the  wells  of  the  nomads, 
destroyed their tents and bombed their livestock. RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.120.
157 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.58.
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After the cession of the Tekna Zone by Spain to Morocco, many of these  Ṣaḥrāwī 
refugees began to settle down in this zone. A severe drought in 1959 to 1963 wiped out 
much of the nomad’s livestock and consequently encouraged settling in the southern 
Moroccan settlements  like  e.g.  Ṭarfāya (ةييافرط),  Ṭānṭān (ناطناط)  and further  north, 
Kulmīm (مييملك).158 In this period  Ṣaḥrāwīs, driven by economic as well  as political 
factors, also started settling in the small growing towns of Western Sahara, and in 
centers like Tindūf (فودنت) in Algeria and Zouerate in Mauritania.159
4.4. ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND SEDENTARIZATION
After World War II, the Spanish colony was almost a forgotten one. Except for the 
fishing,  there were no earnings from the Western Sahara and hardly anything was 
invested in it.160 Imports to Western Sahara were 20 times higher than its exports161, 
still  only  a  handful  of  settlements  were  administered  by  the  Spanish.  However, 
economic and political  developments decisively changed the entire Western Sahara 
situation  when,  in  the  late  1950s,  a  Spanish  geologist  discovered  high-grade 
phosphates  and  ore  deposits  and  consequently  deepened  colonial  interest  in  the 
Western Sahara again.162 The  Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara (ENMINSA)163 
was founded in 1962 and began the extraction of phosphate at Bou Craa in 1972.164 
In order to ensure the Spanish interests, the Western Sahara was declared  a Spanish 
province and  al-a Uyūn, so close to Bou Craa, became the capital in 1961.165 The 
budget for the colony was increased many times over, state-owned companies were 
investing heavily in the territory (to explore for oil or exploitable minerals) and the 
administrative and economic infrastructure was developed rapidly and massively.166 
Suddenly the European settlements grew from a total of 1,710 to 9,726 during 1958 to 
158 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.82.
159 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.122.
160 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.69-70.    
161 GUPTA,  Rakesh:  Sahrawi  Society.  Transition,  Resistance  and  Polisario.  New  Delhi:  Patriot 
Publishers, 1988. p.19.
In the following quoted as: GUPTA: Sahrawi Society.
162 GUPTA: Sahrawi Society. p.19-20. 
163 The function of the ENMINSA was to analyze the discovered minerals concerning their economic 
usability.  BRENNEISEN: Perspektiven des Sahrauischen Nationalismus im Rahmen der Maghrebinischen  
Integration. p.110.
164 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.124.
165 GUPTA: Sahrawi Society. p.18.
166 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.130.
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1967 (excluding the military and foreign legion staff). By 1974 the number doubled to 
20,126 Spaniards in the Western Sahara.167 
The  defeat  in  the  Operation  Ouragan,  its  following  Ṣaḥrāwī mass  escape  and 
additionally the severe catastrophic drought  led to crucial  changes in the Saharawi 
nomadic society.  Many Ṣaḥrāwīs lost their livestock, thus their basis of life and were 
now forced to abandon nomadism to settle and look for work in the growing colonial 
towns of the Western Sahara itself as well as in the neighboring territories (especially 
Ṭānṭān, Tindūf and Zouerate).168 Not more than a village in the 1950s, al-a Uyūn grew 
to a big city having 29,000 inhabitants of which only one-third was Spanish in 1974.169 
Many  Ṣaḥrāwīs  were  unskilled  laborers  or  became  cheap  labors  working  in  the 
phosphate mines at Bou Craa.170 
Unlike the trend of decolonization in the 1960s,  Spain,  with the newly discovered 
wealth, had no intention of preparing its colony for self-rule. In fact,  in 1962,  Spain 
tried to involve the  Ṣaḥrāwī  tribal chiefs in the Spanish administration by creating 
territorial djamāa as,  a series of locally based advisory councils.171 But Spain did not 
succeed in  its  attempts  to  keep the Western Sahara away from the decolonization 
process through formal political and administrative involvement. Moreover the rapid 
social change in the Ṣaḥrāwī society encouraged the birth of a new modern form of an 
opposition that went beyond the tribal forms of resistance.172 
4.5. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND THE  ADVISORY OPINION OF THE  ICJ
167 ibid.  
168 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.10.
169 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.130.
170 Rössel  about the  Ṣaḥrāwī social change: „1974 wurden – nach einer spanischen Volkszählung –  
8000 lohnabhängige Sahrauis gezählt. Auch wenn die Volkszählung kaum alle traditionellen Bewohner 
der  Westsahara  erfasst  hat,  zeigen  ihre  Ergebnisse  doch,  mit  welcher  Geschwindigkeit  sich  das 
traditionelle Nomadenleben in der Westsahara von Anfang der  sechziger bi Mitte der siebziger Jahre 
verändert hatte. Danach stellten die Sahrauis 5465 Hilfsarbeiter in der Kolonie, 435 Industriearbeiter,  
707 Fahrer, 190 Büroangestellte, 141 Lehrer (fast ausschließlich für Koranschulen) sowie 134 Soldaten 
und Polizisten. Andere Sahrauis versuchten in der Städten weiter ihrem traditionellen Lebenserwerb als  
Händler nachzugehen.“ RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.130-131. 
171 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.139.
172 cf. chapter 5.
41
In 1962 the UN General Assembly established the (decolonization) Committee of 24 to 
monitor and advice on the implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization173 and 
in 1963 Western Sahara was included on its list of non-self-governing territories. 
Thereafter the United Nations urged Spain to hold a referendum on self-determination 
in the territory. The General Assembly adopted its first resolution on Western Sahara 
in  1965  requesting  Spain  to  decolonize  the  territory.  Subsequently  the  Western 
Saharan question was regularly considered by the UN requesting Spain – each year 
between 1967 and 1973 – to organize a referendum on self-determination under UN 
supervision.174  Algeria, Mauritania, as well as Morocco endorsed the calls for self-
determination being made at the UN and the implementation of a referendum. (But 
Morocco and Mauritania were privately seeking a bilateral solution.175) In 1973, as a 
result of growing international pressure, along with effective POLISARIO176 military 
assaults, Spain finally agreed to hold a referendum on self-determination under UN 
auspices during the first six months of 1975.177  
Major changes for Northwest Africa were to come about: Independence was already 
gained by Morocco (1956), two new states emerged, Mauritania (1960) and Algeria 
(1962) and the Ṣaḥrāwīs were not alone in desiring control over the Western Sahara. 
At its accession to independence in 1956, Morocco raised a claim for re-establishing 
Greater Morocco and laid claim to such territories as much of the Algerian Sahara or 
the Western Sahara as part of Morocco’s pre-colonial empire.178 The withdrawal of the 
French was only a partial victory for Morocco and the new gained independence was 
173 In 1955 Spain signed the UN-Charter  which obliged the members  of  the UN with colonies  to 
“recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount” and “to 
develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist  
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions” (Article 73 of UN-Charter). The 
following  UN General  Assembly’s  declaration of  1960,  known as Resolution 1514,  stated that  all 
people have a right to self-determination and proclaimed that colonialism should be brought to a rapid 
and unconditional end. cf. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm 
174 CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.33.   
175 ROUSSELLIER,  Jacques  Eric:  Quicksand in  the  Western  Sahara?  From Referendum Stalemate  to  
Negotiated Solution.  p.314. In:  International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice. Vol.10, 
No.2/June 2005. Brill Academic Publishers. p.311-336. 
In the following quoted as: ROUSSELLIER: Quicksand in the Western Sahara?
For a list on the special interests of the involved parties, see Appendix II. 
176 Within the Western Sahara, Ṣaḥrāwī nationalists created the anti-colonial organization Polisario in 
May 1973, which began to take up arms against the Spanish presence in the territory. cf. chapter 5.3.
177 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.440.
178  ibid., p.188.
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an incomplete one, as a Allāl al-Fāsī, the main leader of Morocco’s nationalist  Ḥizb 
al-Istiḳlāl (Independence Party) declared: 
“So long as  Tangier  is  not  liberated  from its  international  
statute, so long as the Spanish deserts of the south, the Sahara from 
Tindouf  to  Atar  and  the  Algerian-Morocco  borderlands  are  not  
liberated  from  their  trusteeship,  our  independence  will  remain  
incomplete and our first duty will be to carry on action to liberate the  
country and to unify it.”179 
King  Ḥasan  II  adopted  al-Fāsī’s  ideology  of  Greater  Morocco  and  changed  his 
political strategy. He renounced his former support for UN decolonization principles, 
disapproved  the  holding  of  a  referendum  and  asserted  that  Western  Sahara  had 
historically been part of Greater Morocco, a territory that includes the whole Western 
Sahara, portions of southwest Algeria, all of Mauritania and parts of Mali.180  
179 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.127.
180 HODGES: Western Sahara.p.85-86.
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Greater Morocco181
In addition to Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria soon began to show their interest in 
the Western Sahara. Mauritania considered this area as a part of Greater Mauritania, 
because of its historical,  ethnical,  religious and geographical  affiliation182.  Whereas 
Algeria did not raise any territorial claims but felt responsible for the future of Western 
Sahara  due  to  the  common border  and  its  own experiences  in  fighting  a  war  of 
independence.183 
In 1960  Morocco refused to recognize Mauritania as an independent state and even 
briefly went to war with Algeria in 1963.184 Ḥasan II was able to finally settle the 
territorial disputes with Algeria and Mauritania185 in 1969 to 1972, but the claim to 
Western Sahara remained.186 
Unexpectedly, Western Sahara seemed to head towards independence and with the 
new  strong  nationalist  inclinations  of  the Ṣaḥrāwīs,  Ḥasan  II,  already  politically 
weakened at home as well as abroad, became flustered.187 
In  December  1974,  Morocco  convinced  Spain  to  delay  the  referendum  until  the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its advisory opinion on Morocco’s and 
Mauritania’s historic claims to the territory.188 The questions to be answered by the ICJ 
were:
181 ibid., p.87.
182 Mauritanian’s President Moktar Ould Daddah (al-Mukhtār Wuld Dāddāh): “I can’t help evoking the 
innumerable ties which unite us: we bear the same names, we speak the same language, we conserve  
the same noble traditions, we honor the same religious leaders, graze our herds on the same pastures,  
give water to them at the same wells. In a word we are referring to that same desert civilization of  
which we are so justly  proud.  So  I  invite  our brothers  of  Spanish  Sahara  to  dream of  this  great  
economic and spiritual Mauritania.” Cited in: HODGES: Western Sahara. p.100.
183 GNIDIL: Die völkerrechtliche Lage der ehemaligen Spanischen Sahara.p.37. 
184 ibid. 
185 Mauritania also claimed Western Sahara as part of Greater Mauritania.  HODGES p.100 ff
186 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.128.
187 In the past Ḥasan II had endorsed the holding of a referendum, but with the newly grown Ṣaḥrāwī 
nationalism he knew that Western Sahara would endorse the creation of an independent state rather 
than Moroccan integration. The irredentist parties of Morocco would not have tolerated this and the 
armed Moroccan forces had already tried twice to get Ḥasan II out of the way in 1971 and 1972. Thus 
he had to come up with an idea in order to turn the tide.  PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of 
Western Sahara. p.210-211.
188 GNIDIL: Die völkerrechtliche Lage der ehemaligen Spanischen Sahara.p.42-43. 
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1.  Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the  
time of  colonization  by  Spain  a  territory  belonging  to  no  one  
(terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
2.  What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom 
of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?189
3 months later, on October 16, 1975 the advisory opinion was presented. The question 
whether Western Sahara had been a terra nullius before colonization was explicitly 
answered in the negative.190 Concerning the question about legal ties between Western 
Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania, the court came to the following result: 
“The  materials  and  information  presented  to  the  Court  show  the 
existence,  at  the  time  of  Spanish  colonization,  of  legal  ties  of  
allegiance  between the Sultan of  Morocco and some of  the tribes  
living  in  the  territory  of  Western  Sahara.  They  equally  show  the  
existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which  
constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood  
by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, 
the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented 
to it  do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the 
territory  of  Western  Sahara  and the  Kingdom of  Morocco  or  the  
Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a  
nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular,  
of  the principle of  self-determination through the free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.”191
Put  simply,  the  court  rejected  Moroccan  and  Mauritanian  claims  to  pre-colonial 
sovereignty in Western Sahara and recommended the UN that the referendum should 
proceed, enabling the Ṣaḥrāwīs to choose whether they wanted Western Sahara to turn 
into an independent state or to be annexed to Morocco or Mauritania.
189 ibid., see also ICJ advisory opinion on Western Sahara of October 16, 1975: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&code=sa&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&k=69&p3=5 
[23.5.08]
190 ibid.
191 ibid.
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Morocco interpreted the ICJ advisory opinion in its own interest and a few hours after 
the ICJ had published its result, the king announced the  Green March192, a strategic 
mass demonstration, , in order to force Spain to hand over the Western Sahara. 
Ḥasan II justified the Green March as follows: 
“Nous avions le bon droit pour nous. Mais il nous fallait attendre une 
hypothétique  résolution  de  l’O.N.U.  Il  s’agissait  donc,  après  une 
année  de  procédure  et  de  consultations  internationales,  de  faire  
passer dans la réalité ce qui était théoriquement acquis, et menaçait  
de  s’enliser  dans  les  sables  du  désert.  Puisque  notre  Sahara  ne 
pouvait venir à nous, nous devions aller à lui. Il nous attendait. Nous  
devions  retourner  chez  nous,  pacifiquement,  résolument,  forts  de  
notre bon droit, de notre raison. Nous devions retrouver nos frères 
sahraouis, volontairement et avec enthousiasme. Il était inimaginable 
que nous fissions à l’Espagne une guerre qui n’avait pad de sens et  
que nul désirait, ni a Madrid, ni à Rabat. Alors que le départ des 
Espagnoles  était  une  certitude  proclamée,  il  n’était  pas  non  plus  
concevable que nous laissions notre terre vide, abandonnée! Ainsi fut  
décidée la Marche Verte.“193
According to Pazzanita and Hodges the Moroccan participants of the Green March 
were  convinced to  consider  themselves  as  “holy  warriors”  (نييدهاجم -  mudjāhidīn), 
armed only with the Koran and waving flags, who were reclaiming and dispensing 
Islamic territory from the European infidel.194 On November 6, 1975, the Green March 
was launched with approximately 350,000195 unarmed Moroccans crossing the Western 
Saharan border.196  After covering a distance of 20 km inland, the March was stopped 
because Spain agreed to negotiate with Morocco and Mauritania to the exclusion of 
Algeria.197  
192 The march (ءارضخلا ةريسملا – al-masīra al- khaḍrā’) was named after the holy color of Islam. 
CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.54.
193 HASSAN II: Le défi. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1976. p.175.
In the following quoted as: HASSAN II: Le défi. 
194 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.193-194.
195 Ḥasan II chose the number of 350,000 because this is the yearly Moroccan birth-rate. 
HASSAN II: Le défi. p.176.
196 HASSAN II: Le défi. p.178.
197 ROUSSELLIER: Quicksand in the Western Sahara? p.315. 
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The Ṣaḥrāwīs denounced the Green March as an invasion. The UN Security Council, 
convened at the request of Spain198, urged Morocco to withdraw from Western Sahara, 
but no effective action was sanctioned when its resolutions were ignored.199
On November 14, 1975 Spain, which by then was preoccupied with domestic affairs 
(and Franco’s health fast deteriorating) and with a view of preserving at least some of 
its interests in Western Sahara, signed the secret Madrid Agreement with Morocco and 
Mauritania.200 This tripartite agreement stipulated the end of Spanish presence in the 
territory and the cession of Western Sahara.201 Furthermore a transitional government 
was created until the djamāa a would decide about the future of Western Sahara. 
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff resumed the Madrid Agreement as follows: 
“According to [the agreement’s] publicized terms, Spain agreed to  
decolonize the Sahara and leave the area before 28 February 1976. In 
the  interim,  the  territory  would  be  administered  by  the  Spanish 
governor general, assisted by two Moroccan and Mauritanian deputy  
governors, who would respect Sahraoui public opinion as expressed  
through the yemaa. […] As to the Bu Craa deposits,  Spain would  
retain 35 per cent of the shares in the Fosbucraa company, and a  
portion  of  the  65  per  cent  that  would  go  to  Morocco  would 
presumably  be  allotted  to  Mauritania.  Reportedly  there  were 
unpublicized  agreements  among  the  three  signatories  that  gave 
satisfaction  to  Spain  as  regards  its  fishing  rights  and  included  a  
postponement of further Moroccan demands for the presidios, as well  
as  compensation  for  repatriated  Spanish  and  Canary  Island 
civilians.”202 
Spain set the deadline for its withdrawal from  the Western Sahara on February 28, 
1976.203 Instead,  Moroccan  and  Mauritanian  troops  arrived  and  the  region  was 
subdivided between them, with Morocco taking control of the northern two thirds as its 
Southern Provinces (about 170,000 sq km, including  al-a Uyūn and the phosphate 
mines) and Mauritania occupying the southern third (about 96,000 sq km) of Western 
198 After  36  years  of  fascism,  Spain  was  not  in the  position  to  militarily  challenge  the  territorial 
ambitions of Morocco. PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.194-196.
199 ibid. 
200 For a comic on the tripartite Madrid Agreement, see Appendix III.
201 CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.33.
202 THOMPSON/ADLOFF: The Western Saharans. p.175.
203 CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.60.
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Sahara as Tīris al-Gharbiyya (ةييبرغلا سريت).204 When Mauritania abandoned the claims 
to its portion in 1979, this area was absorbed by Morocco.205 
Neither the UN nor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) challenged the legality 
of the tripartite agreement.206 The Moroccan and Mauritanian moves were met with 
vehement  opposition  by  the  POLISARIO.  It  refused  the  Madrid  Agreement  and 
declared that it would continue to fight for the independence of Western Sahara – by 
now with the backing from Algeria. The  djamāa a was dissolved and a Provisional 
Ṣaḥrāwī National Council was set up.207 The Frente POLISARIO was set as the only 
legitimate and officially recognized representative of the Ṣaḥrāwī people.208 One day 
after the Spanish withdrawal, on February 26, 1976, the  Ṣaḥrāwī Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR)209 was  proclaimed  in  Bīr  Lḥlū  (ولحل رييب)210 and  the  POLISARIO 
declared armed hostilities against Morocco and Mauritania.211 
5. ṢAḤRĀWĪ NATIONALISM
5.1. LOSS OF THE TRIBAL IDENTITY 
The  Ṣaḥrāwī men and women as people of the desert,  camel-herding nomads and 
speakers of the Ḥassāniyya dialect, had never been subservient to either the sultans of 
Morocco to  the north nor to  the Mauritanian  emirs  to  the south.  Furthermore the 
Ṣaḥrāwīs never constituted a nation in pre-colonial times and today’s nationalism took 
root only towards the end of Spanish colonization. The pacification of 1934 terminated 
intertribal raiding but notions of tribal identity and loyalty had changed little by the 
1950s.  With the awakened Spanish interest  in  Western Sahara’s natural  resources, 
rapid  social  changes  came  along.  The  increase  in  employment  and  educational 
204 GNIDIL: Die völkerrechtliche Lage der ehemaligen Spanischen Sahara. p.47.
205 ibid., p.51.
206 THOMPSON/ADLOFF: The Western Saharans. p.176-177.
207 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.362.
208 CLAUSEN: Der Konflikt um die Westsahara. p.62-63.
209 For the proclamation of the first government of the SADR see: http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm
210 Bīr Lḥlū lies about 125 km west of the Algerian border.
211 cf. chapter 5.3.3. and 6. 
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opportunities in the colonial towns, as well as droughts, were the reasons why many 
Ṣaḥrāwīs abandoned their nomadic life and settled in the urban areas where members 
of different tribal and social status now lived, worked and went to school together. 
Spending much of their childhood as nomads and later settling in towns and going to 
school, a new educated generation of Ṣaḥrāwīs grew up. Influenced by the modern 
liberation theories of that time, they developed their own political awareness which 
fueled  new anti-colonial  sentiments after  the  collapse  of  the  AL and  created  the 
conditions  for  the  emergence  of  a  Ṣaḥrāwī  identity  that  went  beyond  traditional 
kinship ties.212 
5.2. RISE OF ṢAḤRĀWĪ NATIONALISM      
The Ḥarakat Taḥrīr Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’ wa-Río de Oro “Movement for the Liberation of 
Sāḳiyat al-Ḥamrā’ and  Río de Oro”213, was started clandestinely towards the end of 
1967 by Muḥammad Sidi Brahim Bassiri, a Ṣmāra-based Koranic teacher to call for an 
independent Western Sahara. Since the crushing of the AL in 1958, the Ḥarakat Tahrir 
became the first serious anti-colonial  challenge to the Spanish – with the essential 
difference that the Ḥarakat Tahrir engaged in peaceful forms of protest. Bassiri, born in 
1942  in  Ṭānṭān,  was  a  young  Ṣaḥrāwī  who had been  influenced by  radical  Arab 
nationalist ideas while studying abroad in Cairo and Damascus.214
Unlike  previous  forms  of  resistance  the  Ḥarakat  Tahrir  was  the  first  urban-based 
movement and called for internal autonomy, whereby a time limit should be fixed for 
the final decolonization and advocated wide-ranging social and economic reforms. It 
also  sought  radical  changes  to  the  Ṣaḥrāwī  djamāa a215 and  the  ineffective, 
212 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.151-153.
213 This movement is also known as the Muslim Party (ملسملا بزحلا - al-Ḥizb al-Muslim).
214 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.153.
215 Rössel  writes that the territorial  djamāa a which was set up by the Spanish authorities, only was 
used as an alibi  and had no legislative powers: „Mit dem Ausbau der Infrastruktur in der Sahara-
Kolonie  und  einer  verstaerkten  Ansiedlung  spanischer  Siedler  versuchte  die  spanische  Tegierung  
erstmals auch die Sahrauis in das System der Koloniealvermaltung einzubeziehen. […] 1967 wurde  
zusätzlich  eine  „Generalversammlung  der  Sahara“  eingerichtet,  die  sich  mit  dem  traditionellem  
sahrauischen Namen „Djemaa“ schmückte.  Diese  Djemaa setzte  sich auch insgesamt  82 Sahrauis  
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undemocratic political mechanisms set up by the colonialists to ‘represent’  Ṣaḥrāwī 
interests.216 Bassiri wanted to bring about change through peaceful democratic action. 
As a small secret organization it spread its propaganda through word of mouth. The 
movement attracted a broad base of support217, particularly from the  Ṣaḥrāwī youth 
and the  Ṣaḥrāwīs who had received some education and found employment in the 
urban settlements.218 On June 17, 1970 the movement decided to appear in public and 
to  present  its  list  of  demands  to  the  colonial  government  through  a  peacefully 
organized demonstration whilst concurrently holding a counterdemonstration to a pro-
Spanish  rally  sponsored  by  the  colonial  authorities  in  al-a Uyūn.219 About  1,500 
Ṣaḥrāwīs gathered in Zemla, an outlying suburb of al-a Uyūn. The protest was dealt 
with in  a decisively harsh manner and was bloodily suppressed by the occupation 
forces. Troops of the Spanish Foreign Legion opened fire on the demonstrating crowd 
of Ṣaḥrāwīs, killing an unknown number of demonstrators220. Many of the movement’s 
leading activists were arrested and imprisoned for months. Bassiri himself was jailed 
and “disappeared” in Spanish custody. Since his detention, there has been no trace of 
him. Bassiri is regarded as the first modern-day Ṣaḥrāwī martyr.221 
The Zemla shootings shattered the Ḥarakat Ṭahrir but this massacre was to become the 
turning point  in  the  evolution  of  the  Ṣaḥrāwī  resistance  to  colonial  power.  Many 
Ṣaḥrāwī nationalists abandoned the hope of a peaceful end to colonial occupation and 
were convinced to return to the old tradition of the quick and sudden ghazwas and the 
zusammen.  […] Die  Djemaa blieb  von  allen  wichtigen  Entscheidungen  ausgeschlossen.  Sie  durfte  
lediglich Empfehlungen  - etwa zu wirtschaftlichen oder sozialen Fragen der Kolonie – abgeben, an die  
der Gouverneur aber in keinem Fall gebunden war.“  In: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.
134-135. Pazzanita continues: “Saharawi nationalists decried the Djemmaa, partly because most of its  
members were not directly elected and because most of those who were elected were chosen in tribal  
constituencies.  The body was clearly weighted in favor of  the older,  more traditionalist  element of  
Saharawi society and consisted overwhelmingly of Saharawis who were openly prepared to collaborate  
with the colonial authorities.” In: PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.117. 
216 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.203-204.
217 Rössel quotes that the Ḥarakat Tahrir already had 4700 members in 1970. In: RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand 
und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.137.  
218 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.154.
219 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.204.
220 According  to  Hodges,  the  Spanish  government  stated  that  2  Sahrawis  were  killed,  with  20 
wounded, while Mauritania claimed that 12 Sahrawi were killed. In: HODGES: Western Sahara. p.155. 
221 ibid.
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gun.222 Only 3 years later, in 1973, the militant Frente POLISARIO was formed. This 
time the Ṣaḥrāwīs were calling for an armed revolution. 
5.3. CHANGE OF RESISTANCE: THE FRENTE POLISARIO
On May 10, 1973 the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de 
Oro,  better  known  as  the  Frente  POLISARIO,  was  formally  constituted  at  a 
clandestine  congress  held  in  Ain  Bentili at  the  Western  Saharan  -  Mauritanian 
border.223 The attending group consisted of  Ṣaḥrāwī students,  veterans of the anti-
colonial struggle,  Ṣaḥrāwī workers who had settled in Algeria and Mauritania and of 
oppositionists  within  the  Western  Sahara  itself.224 An  executive  committee  was 
appointed and 25-year old al-Wālī was elected as the group’s Secretary General. The 
Frente POLISARIO opted for guerilla warfare from the very beginning. Its explicit 
intention was to use military force to end Spanish colonization.225 
On May 20, 1973, only 10 days later, the Frente POLISARIO launched its first raid on 
a small Spanish military post in the northeast of the territory, at which the Tropas 
Nómadas 226 were overrun and their rifles seized.227 
5.3.1. Al-Wālī and the nucleus of the new liberation movement
Al-Wālī  Muṣṭafā Sayyid (دييس ىفطيصم يلاولا) was a typical representative of the new 
educated Ṣaḥrāwī youth. Born in 1948 somewhere in the north of Western Sahara, he 
settled with his family in Tan-Tan after the defeat of the AL in 1958. Al-Wālī attended 
school and with a scholarship he entered the Mohammad V University in Rabat in 
222 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.157.
223 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.142.
224 ibid.,p.147.
225 At the first congress the POLISARIO issued a political manifesto proclaiming that the front has 
been founded as the “unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed 
struggle as the means by which the Saharawi Arab African people can recover its total liberty and foil  
to maneuvers of Spanish colonialism”. Cited in: HODGES: Western Sahara. p.161. 
226 Founded in 1926,  the Tropas  Nómadas  was a  Ṣaḥrāwī  camel  corps  under Spanish rule  whose 
function  it  was to  patrol  the desert  interior  of  the  Western  Sahara.  In  1974 the Tropas  Nómadas 
incorporated 1,341 Ṣaḥrāwīs. PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.434.
227 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.162-163.
The date of this first armed attack gave the name to the monthly newspaper of the Frente Polisario 
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order to study law in 1970. There he met about 30 to 40 more  Ṣaḥrāwī students of 
whom several later were going to acquire important positions in the POLISARIO.228 At 
first the students gathered to informal roundtable discussions. Being familiar with the 
UN resolutions and influenced by the happenings in the Western Sahara, Bassiri, the 
Palestinian liberation struggle  and the left-wing swing sweeping their  campus,  the 
student group devoted more and more of their energy to the Western Sahara liberation 
effort  and  underwent  rapid  political  changes  between  1971  and  1973.229 Seeing 
themselves  as  the  nucleus  of  a  new  liberation  movement,  they  began  recruiting 
Ṣaḥrāwīs  within  the  Western  Sahara  itself  and  among the  Ṣaḥrāwīs  living  in  the 
diaspora and the launch of their armed liberation struggle was prepared.230 
5.3.2. Early days and following political and diplomatic growth 
Despite being a  small,  poorly armed group, who mainly relied on captured Spanish 
arms,  the effectiveness  of  the guerrilla  fighters grew over  the next  two years  and 
through staging frequent small hit-and-run-attacks the Frente  POLISARIO gradually 
gained control over large strips of desert countryside by 1975.231 
The level of support gained from the Saharawi population also grew dramatically. The 
political power of the front increased when, from early 1975232, the Tropas Nómadas 
began deserting to the Frente POLISARIO, bringing weapons, training and experience 
with them.233 Besides (ironically) Mauritania, who allowed the Frente POLISARIO to 
operate in its northern border regions and Libya, who provided the Ṣaḥrāwī guerillas 
with some weapons, particularly Algeria gave the movement substantial support from 
early 1975, after it became aware of the depth of the Ṣaḥrāwī nationalist aspirations.234 
On August 25 to 31, 1974, the Frente POLISARIO held its second congress, at which 
a  manifesto,  declaring  the  unambiguous  aims  in  favor  of  full  independence,  was 
228 HODGES: Western Sahara. p.157-158.
229 ibid., p.159.
230 ibid.
231 ibid., p.161.
232 By the beginning of 1975 the POLISARIO guerillas still were not more than a few hundred and 
quasi had no modern weapons. HODGES: Western Sahara. p.162. 
233 According to Pazzanita/Hodges, it was at least 90 per cent of the Tropas Nómadas that joined the 
Frente POLISARIO. PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.434.
234 RÖSSEL: Wind, Sand und (Mercedes-) Sterne. p.148.
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adopted: “[…] The Saharawi people have no alternative but to struggle until wresting 
independence, their wealth, and their full sovereignty over their land.”235 
Al-Wālī was re-elected as the Secretary General and a “program of national action” 
was adopted which stated the front’s firm aims: 
- fight against all forms of colonialism and obtainment of complete independence
- creation of a free, independent state
- nationalization of natural resources and fair distribution
- abolishment of the old tribal hierarchy and affiliation
- provision of adequate housing and health facilities
- an Arabic educational system and compulsory schooling for boys and girls
- political and social equality for women236 
On May 1975, the popular support of the Frente POLISARIO was revealed, when a 
UN Visiting Mission visited the Western Sahara and thousands of pro-POLISARIO 
demonstrators went onto the street. The UN team realized that the Frente POLISARIO 
was – other than assumed heretofore - a dominant political force in the territory and 
that the Ṣaḥrāwīs strictly wanted independence rather than integration with Morocco 
or Mauritania.237 
In 1974 the Spanish government relented to international pressure and finally promised 
to  hold  a  referendum on self-determination  under  UN auspices  during  the first  6 
months of 1975.238 All at once Western Sahara seemed to head towards independence. 
But in the meantime, Morocco and Mauritania already had other plans for the territory 
and were claiming that the Western Sahara belonged to them. After Moroccan pressure 
through the Green March and with Franco’s health deteriorating, Spain finally reneged 
on its earlier promise to holding a referendum and signed the Madrid Accords with 
Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975, handing Western Sahara over to those 
two  neighboring  countries.239 The  Frente  POLISARIO rebased  in  Tindūf  (western 
regions of Algeria) and kept up the guerilla war. 
5.3.3. The Ṣaḥrāwī Arab Democratic Republic
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A few days after the Madrid Agreement, a gathering of the formerly Spanish-backed 
djamāa a was held, signing the Proclamation of Guelta Zemmūr, which dissolved the 
djamāa a  who  were  now  supporting  the  POLISARIO,  and  set  up  a  Provisional 
Ṣaḥrāwī National Council.240 On February 27, 1976 the Provisional Ṣaḥrāwī National 
Council  proclaimed a government-in-exile  near Bīr  Lḥlū  and announced “[…] the 
birth of a free, independent, sovereign state, ruled by an Arab, national, democratic 
system of unionist, progressive orientation and of Muslim religion, named the Ṣaḥrāwī 
Arab Democratic Republic” (SADR).241
Currently the SADR has been recognized by 83 states (including 21 states that have 
withdrawn  their  former  recognitions  and  10  that  have  frozen  their  diplomatic 
relations). Almost all were African or Latin American countries.  Ṣaḥrāwī embassies 
exist in 13 states.242 The SADR is a member of the AU, but not of the UN. In 1984 
Morocco withdrew from the AU in protest and remains the only African nation not 
within the AU.243 However, the UN and the European Union do recognize the Frente 
POLISARIO as a legitimate representative of the Western Saharan people. 
     Flag of the SADR
                                                                                     Emblem of the SADR
                                                                      ḥurriyya, dīmūqrāṭiyya, waḥda - liberty, democracy, unity
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5.3.4. Mass escape to Tindūf
After the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion, the majority of the  Ṣaḥrāwīs initially 
fled eastward to the POLISARIO-controlled desert areas within the Western Sahara. In 
February 1976, Morocco dropped napalm-, phosphorus- and fragmentation bombs on 
Ṣaḥrāwī refugee camps,  mainly inhabited by women,  children and old people and 
caused heavy casualties.244 
Because the own safety could no longer be guaranteed, the Ṣaḥrāwīs fled southwest to 
neighboring Algeria  where by April  1976 50,000 refugees had already gathered in 
Tindūf.245 At  the  outset  of  the  war  POLISARIO’s  principal  objective  was  the 
evacuation  of  the  Ṣaḥrāwī  refugees  and  by  May  1976,  the  refugees  were  safely 
relocated to Algeria. Now the front was able to concentrate on the offensive against 
Mauritania and Morocco.246 
Moroccan bombings and escape routes in 1975/1976247
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Algeria as the strongest regional ally of the Ṣaḥrāwīs, provided the front not only with 
refugee  facilities,  but  also with  weaponry,  rear  bases  and training for  the guerilla 
army.248 Within months the army expanded to several thousand armed fighters and by 
the  early  1980s  the  armed  wing  of  the  Frente  POLISARIO,  known  as  Ṣaḥrāwī 
Popular Liberation Army  (SPLA) had grown into a well-equipped estimated 15,000 
men force.249 The military capacities of the POLISARIO forces are largely unknown. 
Bhatia states an estimation of 3000 to 6000 soldiers,  but stresses that  this number 
underestimates the total manpower and that “the movement could likely mobilize a 
substantial portion of its above-16 male population within 24 hours in order to resume 
combat.”250
6. STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
 6.1. AT WAR WITH MAURITANIA (1975-1979)…
POLISARIO’s  first  priority  was  to  defeat  Mauritania,  the  weaker  of  the  two 
adversaries.  Mauritania  had  a  very  small  army  of  only  3,000  men  and  some 
paramilitary units and was one of the poorest countries in the world, being dependent 
on its exports of iron ore from the mines of Zouerate.251 The POLISARIO guerillas 
made  the  about  650  km  long  railway  line,  from  the  iron  mines  to  the  port  of 
Nwadhibou, one of their major targets  and disrupted the export  of iron ore.252 The 
Mauritanian forces were stretched to the limit and they were unable to defend their 
territory against  incursions.  In  1979 Mauritania,  close to  bankruptcy,  withdrew its 
troops from the territory, negotiated a peace deal with the Frente POLISARIO and 
renounced all its claims by signing the Algiers Agreement.253 Consequently Mauritania 
recognized the SADR as a legitimate government of the Ṣaḥrāwīs. 
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On June 9, 1976 the guerillas crossed 1,500 km of desert and attacked Mauritania’s 
capital Nouakchott. Al-Wālī, shot through the head, died in this ghazw.254 Al-Wālī‘s 
death did not result in the collapse of  Ṣaḥrāwī morale, but rather rallied the fighting 
spirit of the Ṣaḥrāwīs and their will to resist.255 June 9, has been declared The Day of  
the Martyrs, a national holiday of the SADR that honors all Ṣaḥrāwīs who were killed 
in their fight for independence.256
6.2. …AND WITH MOROCCO (1975-1991)
After  Mauritania’s  withdrawal  from  the  Western  Sahara,  Morocco  immediately 
unilaterally  annexed  Tīris  al-Gharbiyya  in  August  1979.  In  Morocco  the  Frente 
POLISARIO faced a more determined aggressor than its former opponents Spain and 
Mauritania. Morocco, with an initial 40,000 troops, received strong military aid from 
France and the USA.257 Ḥasan II assumed a quick war, but the fight was now to be 
transformed into an expensive and seemingly endless war of attrition in the desert by 
the POLISARIO. 
6.2.1. The Houari Boumédienne Offensive
From January 4, 1979 to October 14, 1979, the Frente POLISARIO launched a series 
of about a dozen major attacks against Morocco, known as the Houari Boumédienne 
Offensive258. The POLISARIO fielded around 3,000 to 5,000 men at a time, armed with 
modern weapons, including rocket launchers with a 20 km-range.259 The targets were 
Moroccan positions in the northern portion of Western Sahara, as well as in the desert 
regions of southern Morocco.260 For the first time in the course of war towns and major 
Moroccan bases were assaulted and their defenses effectively breached.
Some  of the  most  spectacular  military  operations  of  the  Houari  Boumédienne 
Offensive were:
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-  The  first  attack  of  the  offensive  was  an  assault  on  two  control  stations  of  the 
phosphate conveyor belt from Bou Craa to the Atlantic coast.261  
- On January 28, the guerillas succeeded in fighting their way into Ṭānṭān and briefly 
occupied this south Moroccan town which was attacked twice more on June 13, and 
June  27,  1979.  During  the  occupation  for  about  4  hours,  the  guerillas  destroyed 
military installations, the Gendarmerie barracks, oil depots, the power station, a local 
bank and freed hundreds of Ṣaḥrāwī prisoners.262 
-  A massive attack against the southern Moroccan town Lebouirate came on August 
24, when the POLISARIO fighters overran a 1,000-man military garrison, killing a 
large  number  of  the  Moroccan  soldiers  and  capturing  a  great  amount  of  matériel 
(including tanks and armored vehicles).263  
-  On October 6, a large POLISARIO force attacked Ṣmāra and evacuated about 700 
Ṣaḥrāwīs who were relocated to the refugee camps in Tindūf.264 
The Frente POLISARIO penetrated more and more into Moroccan territory, causing 
great losses in Moroccan soldiers and equipment, and Ḥasan’s forces were obliged to 
give up scores of bases in the interior in order to consolidate the defenses of the more 
important towns and bases near the coast. At the beginning of the 1980s Morocco held 
only the main towns, whereas the Frente POLISARIO controlled about five sixths of 
the hinterland.265 
6.2.2. A new challenge: the defensive walls
Faced with the high costs  of  lives  and equipment that  went along with defending 
widely scattered and exposed outposts, the Moroccan army, already doubled in size, 
retrenched  and  concentrated  on  clearing  the  POLISARIO  out  of  their  “Southern 
Provinces” and especially on keeping them out of the rich area in the northwestern 
Sāḳiyat  al-Ḥamrā’ encompassing  al-a Uyūn,  Ṣmāra  and  the  Bou  Craa  phosphate 
261 The  conveyor  belt  in  Bou  Craa  was  the  target  of  several  Ṣaḥrāwī  raids.  In  1976,  the  front 
effectively had attacked the conveyor belt and its power lines. The extraction had to be stopped and 
was put out of action for the next six years.
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mines, known as the “useful triangle”.266 Hence, in 1981, Morocco started sealing the 
territory off from attacks by the Frente POLISARIO by erecting defensive walls, also 
known as  berms,  made of  sand and stone.  The  first  defensive  wall,  protected  by 
minefields267, advanced electronic equipment (supplied by the USA and France) and 
Moroccan troop garrisons, was completed in 1982. The wall system has subsequently 
been extended since then, cutting the Western Sahara in two territories – the Moroccan 
occupied zone and – east of the walls – the freed zone which is under POLISARIO 
control.268
266 PAZZANITA/HODGES: Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. p.109.
267 see: http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/western_sahara
268 Michael Bhatia visited the Western Sahara territory under POLISARIO control in 2001 and reports 
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Moroccan berms in the Western Sahara269
The  system of the defensive walls was built in six stages between 1981 and 1987, 
fencing off about 80 percent of the Western Sahara. The external main line follows the 
approximate line of the border with Algeria and Mauritania and is about 2,500 km 
long, protected by a once again doubled Moroccan military presence of about 160,000 
men.270
The defensive walls through the Western Sahara changed the character to the Saharan 
war, limiting the effectiveness of the POLISARIO raids. Morocco was now able to 
concentrate its defenses and react more quickly when the guerillas tried to penetrate 
them.  But the Frente POLISARIO did not abate and after some period of adaptation, 
the guerilla fighters mastered the wall’s characteristics and found out, that the wall was 
penetrable.  From mid-1983  to  1991  a  series  of  major  confrontations  took  place. 
Ṣaḥrāwī nationalists  managed to approach the wall  undetected,  briefly overrun the 
Moroccan positions, catch or kill Moroccan soldiers and capture great quantities of 
Moroccan weapons and equipment.271 
Admittedly, the Moroccan wall system succeeded in keeping the war outside of the 
bulk of the territory. But military expenditure in terms of the hardware and manpower 
needed to maintain it, resulted in a long and costly war of attrition.272 According to 
Rössel, by 1980 Morocco was in a big economic crisis with about US$ 23 billion of 
foreign debts.273 Werner Ruf put the cost of this conduct of war at about US$ 5 million 
daily.274 Only  with  massive  financial  aid  sent  by  Saudi  Arabia  and the  USA,  the 
situation in Morocco could be relieved, but matters gradually became unsustainable for 
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all parties involved.275 Finally, at the end of the 1980s,  Ḥasan II was forced to get 
involved  with  peace  negotiations  and  to  meet  with  POLISARIO  representatives 
directly. 
Eventually  Ḥasan II  announced  that  Morocco  was  amenable  to  an  internationally 
supervised referendum in the Western Sahara and the UN brokered a ceasefire 
between  Morocco and the POLISARIO in late 1991.  But  soon the King 
equivocated about  his  former pledge and,  as Yahia Zoubir  writes,  it  appeared that 
Ḥasan II “never contemplated the possibility of an independent Sahrawi state and he 
was  slow  to  make  any  concrete  move  to  carry  out  his  promise  to  hold  such  a  
referendum.”276 
6.3. DIPLOMATIC BATTLE
After the failure of the efforts of the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in 1975277, 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the first international organization to 
seriously attempt to end the conflict and to find a  suitable  solution. But after the 
diplomatic efforts of the OAU had come to naught, the United Nations intensified its 
efforts to find a solution from late 1980s. 
6.3.1. Settlement Plan
The newly  elected  UN  Secretary  General  Javier  Pérez  de  Cuéllar  presented  a 
Settlement Plan in June 1990 which contained an outline timetable and provided for a 
cease-fire, a transitional period leading to a referendum organized and conducted by 
the United Nations278, reduction and confinement of troops, exchange of prisoners of 
war,  repatriation  of  refugees  and  the  insertion  of  special  representatives  for  a 
supervisory  role279.  A commission  would  update  the  Spanish  census  of  1974 and 
identify the Ṣaḥrāwī electorate who would have the choice between independence and 
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integration with Morocco.280 The UN Security Council approved the implementation 
plan in 1991.281 Both parties, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, accepted the plan 
in principle and it seemed an early resolution to the Western Sahara issue was about to 
happen.
As a part of the Settlement Plan the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara (MINURSO)282 was established in 1991 and set up to carry out the 
plan.283 On the webpage of MINURSO, the mandates the mission has been given are 
stated as follows:  
- monitor the ceasefire 
- verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory 
- monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops  
to designated locations 
- take  steps  with  the  parties  to  ensure  the  release  of  all  Western 
Saharan political prisoners or detainees 
- oversee  the  exchange  of  prisoners  of  war,  to  be  implemented  by  
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
- repatriate the refugees of Western Sahara, a task to be carried out by  
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
- identify and register qualified voters 
- organize and ensure a free and fair  referendum and proclaim the  
results 
- reduce the threat of unexploded ordnances and mines284 
But soon Morocco began to put obstacles in the way of holding the referendum, as 
scheduled,  in January 1992. Pazzanita and Hodges report  that  Morocco “allegedly 
began moving thousands of people from southern Morocco into the territory, stating 
that  they  were  qualified  to  vote  in  the  referendum;  conducted  nearly  constant  
overflights by its aircraft over UN troop positions; and refused to withdraw any of is  
massive  troop  presence  in  Western  Sahara  until  voter  qualification  matters  were  
resolved.”285  
The main problem was (and still is), that Morocco as well as the Frente POLISARIO 
had radically differing approaches to determining which people were entitled to vote 
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in a referendum286 and hence, a long diplomatic drama began, resulting in successive 
deadlocks.
However,  Pérez de Cuéllar deployed the initial MINURSO troops and civilians into 
Western  Sahara  starting  on  September  6,  1991,  even  though  the  issue  of  voter 
qualification had not yet been settled.287 He further proposed that the ceasefire should 
come into effect despite the impossibility of completing all tasks that were supposed 
to be completed before the ceasefire as detailed in the Settlement Plan.288 Following 
the agreement of both parties, the ceasefire was announced on September 6, 1991 and 
Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO both suspended their military operations. 
MINURSO deployment, March 1995289
Identification  centers  were  established  and in  late  August  1994 the identification 
process  was  launched,  but  ground to  a  halt  by  late  1995 because of  the parties’ 
disagreements.290 By then some 60,000 applicants had been identified.291 
286 Additionally  to  Morocco’s  alleged  “importation”  of  “Ṣaḥrāwīs”  into  Western  Sahara,  the 
traditional  nomadism of  the  Ṣaḥrāwīs  raised a lot  of  problems concerning  definition and place  of 
residence.  Each  side  accused  the  other  of  falsifying  documents  and  oral  evidence  from  Ṣaḥrāwī 
shuyūkh.  
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Pérez de Cuéllar’s successor as UN Secretary-General Buṭrus Buṭrus-Ghālī inherited 
the Western Sahara problem, but could not foster the implementation of the remainder 
of  the UN peace plan and the whole process  came to a  dead stop.  The Security 
Council, mindful that the preservation of the ceasefire was a substantial contribution 
of MINURSO, kept on prolonging the mission’s mandate.292
Up to now the assignments of MINURSO have not been consummated and preserving 
ceasefire is a significant accomplishment of the entire mission. The total number of 
MINUSRO military observers including administrative and medical unit officers, is 
216 as to March 2008.293
6.3.2. James Baker III and his attempts to resolve the conflict
In late 1996 Kofi Annan was elected as new UN Secretary General and he appointed 
the  former  U.S.  official  James  Baker  III  in  1997  as  his  Personal  Envoy  for  the 
Western Sahara to reactivate the stalled process.294 Baker held a series of separate 
meetings  with  Moroccan  and  POLISARIO  negotiators  resulting  in  the  Houston 
Accords  which attempted to clear the path for the referendum to be held in 1998, 
defining  the  compilation  procedures  for  the  electoral  body,  troop  confinement, 
refugee  repatriation  and  a  code  of  conduct  for  the  referendum.295 The  Houston 
Accords revived the long-stalled voter registration process296, but after a few weeks, 
differences between Morocco and POLISARIO, notably on the eligibility criteria, re-
emerged  the referendum again  had to  be postponed.  Baker  attempted to  arbitrate 
between the two parties, but did not succeed. 
The negotiations on the future of Western Sahara stalled until June 2001, when Baker 
presented  his  Framework  Agreement  Proposal,  known  as  Baker  Plan  I,  to  the 
international  community.  This  new plan  provided for  an interim of  five  years  of 
autonomy for the Western Sahara within the Moroccan state. Except for defense and 
foreign policy, all remaining decisions over purely local matters (such as supply of 
292 ibid., p.48-56. 
293 UN SG Report on the situation concerning Western Sahara S/2008/251, 2008.
For a list of MINURSO contributions and deployment map, see Appendices IV and V. 
294 UN SG Letter addressed to the Security Council S/1997/236, 1997. 
295 UN SG Report on the situation concerning Western Sahara S/1997/742, 1997.
296 In April 2000, MINURSO eventually finished the identification process and came to a figure of 
86,425 eligible voters. http://www.minurso.unlb.org/IDC.html [07.07.2008]
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water  and  electricity)  would  be  the  responsibility  of  an  elected  local  Ṣaḥrāwī 
government.  After the five years of  autonomy a referendum of  self-determination 
should follow.297
Morocco accepted the plan,  but  the Frente POLISARIO and Algeria  rejected  this 
proposal.298 The  plan  once  more  foundered  on  the  voter  eligibility  question.  The 
Security  Council  proposed  further  negotiations  between  the  parties  and  Baker 
attempted to refine his proposal. 
On May 23, 2003 Baker presented a second autonomy plan, known as the Peace Plan 
for Self-Determination of the People of the Western Sahara or simply as Baker Plan 
II, and which brought along its own set of controversies. This version was roughly 
similar to Baker Plan I, but more detailed. It provided for the self-determination of the 
Ṣaḥrāwīs after a four- to five-year period of provisional administration by a Ṣaḥrāwī 
local government, elected by the people listed in the Provisional Voter List (PVL) of 
MINURSO  (with  86,425  Ṣaḥrāwīs  entitled  to  vote)299.  A  referendum,  with  the 
opportunity  of  choosing among independence,  integration  or  autonomy,  would be 
then allowed by the people listed in the PVLs and the residents in the Western Sahara 
since 1999.300
The Security Council supported this plan.301 Morocco rejected the Baker Plan II and 
despite initial hesitancy, Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO finally accepted the plan 
in the middle of 2003.302 Conciliation was not reached.
In June 2004, Baker resigned as the UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for the 
Western Sahara. The process became deadlocked. Peter van Walsum, a retired Dutch 
diplomat, was appointed as his successor in July 2005.303 
6.3.3. Manhasset negotiations
297 MOHSEN-FINAN,  Khadija:  The Western Sahara Dispute and UN Pressure.  p.8.  In:  Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol.7, No.2 (Summer 2002). Published by Frank Cass. p.1-12.
298 ibid.
299 http://minurso.unlb.org/IDC.html [24.06.2008]
300 JENSEN: Western Sahara. Appendix 5, p.160. 
301 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1495, 2003.
302 SHELLEY, Toby: Behind the Baker Plan for Western Sahara.  In: Middle East Report Online, August 
2003. see: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero080103.html [23.06.08]
303 http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/sga935.html [24.06.08]
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The next essential attempt to find a peaceful solution for the Western Sahara conflict 
were the Manhasset negotiations, a series of four direct talks between Moroccan and 
POLISARIO delegations.  On  April  30,  2007  the UN Security  Council  voted  the 
Resolution 1754, calling on the two parties to enter into direct negotiations with a 
good and sincere will, supervised by Van Walsum. The first round of direct talks took 
place on June 18-19, 2007 in Manhasset, New York.304 No breakthrough was achieved 
and parties met for three more rounds; the last held on March 18-19, 2008 ended 
without any tangible results. 
In  fact,  the  Frente  POLISARIO  announced  that  it  was  ready  to  pursue  direct 
negotiations with Morocco but wanted Van Walsum replaced since they charged Van 
Walsum to be biased in favor of Morocco. Van Walsum said in an interview that was 
published in the Spanish newspaper  El País on August  8,  2008,  that  “un Sáhara 
independiente es inalcanzable”.305 In his opinion the front’s demand for independence 
was an unrealistic  option even though it  was backed by international law but the 
Security Council was not ready yet to exercise its authority and impose it.306
On August 21, 2008 the mandate of the mediator Van Walsum expired and was not 
renewed by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Instead, the American diplomat 
Christopher Ross was appointed the new UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for 
the Western Sahara. 
“La  designación  de  Ross  es  una  relativa  buena  noticia  para  el  
Polisario  que  siempre  ha  deseado  que  el  mediador  de  Naciones 
Unidas fuese un norteamericano porque contaría con el respaldo de 
la administración estadounidense, la única que, según los Saharauis,  
puede ejercer una presión eficaz sobre Marruecos.”307
According to El País, Ross’ nomination was good news for the Frente POLISARIO 
since this implied that Washington was ready for a major involvement in seeking a 
negotiated solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In the eyes of of the front, the 
United States are the only force able to pressure Morocco efficaciously.308     
304 http://www.spsrasd.info/en/infos/2007/06/sps-e180607-8.html [23.06.08] 
305http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Polisario/exige/destitucion/delegado/ONU/Sahara/elpe
piint/20080817elpepiint_9/Tes [15.09.2008]
306 For Van Walsum’s estimation on the issue, see Appendix VI.
307http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/ONU/elige/diplomatico/EE/UU/mediador/Sahara/elpe
piint/20080910elpepiint_3/Tes [15.09.2008]
308 ibid. 
66
International law: “No to autonomy!”
Mohamed VI: “Sounds like yes to me!”
RÉSUMÉ
The question of Western Sahara is one of international legality. In spite of Morocco’s 
ideological  position,  it  is  unambiguously  a  decolonization  issue.  In  1988 the UN 
Security  Council  attended  to  the  Western  Sahara  conflict  and  passed  numerous 
resolutions, but the UN efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the dispute have 
not been successful.  It  looks like  the  Ṣaḥrāwīs are  as far  as ever away from the 
realisation of the right of self-determination. Morocco showed that a referendum that 
might  end its  sovereignty over  the Western Sahara is  obsolete.  Pedro Pinto Leite 
rightly concluded: 
“The invasion,  occupation and annexation  of  Western Sahara and 
East Timor not only formed an obvious violation of the Charter of the  
United  Nations  but  also  an  international  crime  against  peace.  
Moreover, they formed an equally clear violation of the right of the  
Saharawis  and  East  Timorese  to  self-determination  and 
independence. […] In addition the Moroccan government committed 
an act of disobedience against the United Nations by maintaining the  
occupation of the territory even after being repeatedly summoned by  
the Security Council to withdraw their troops.”309
309 PINTO LEITE, Pedro:  International legality versus realpolitik. The cases of Western Sahara and East  
Timor. p.13-14. In: OLSSON, Claes (ed.): The Western Sahara Conflict. The Role of Natural Resources in 
Decolonization. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006. 
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As at  October 2008, matters essentially rested at this juncture and, despite the two 
parties’ commitment to a process of negotiations, an ending to this over three-decade 
dispute remains uncertain. 
Morocco as well as Algeria and their relation to more powerful states are important 
key players to affect the deadlocked situation. Just as constant as Morocco’s claims to 
the territory was Algeria’s rejection of the Moroccan claims and its support of the 
Frente POLISARIO and the inalienable right of the Ṣaḥrāwīs to self-determination. 
In all the various approaches to an adequate solution of the conflict, the core was the 
electoral roll of who was allowed to vote for or against integration with Morocco or 
independence. Never was there a moment when the process could deliver a result that 
was politically acceptable to Morocco as well as to the Frente POLISARIO and that 
both would willingly implement.  As mentioned earlier,  many resolutions had been 
passed, but the UN Security Council never mentioned sanctions or put serious political 
pressure on Morocco in order to stop the prospect of endless negotiations. France and 
the USA have (strategic, political, economic) interests in northwest Africa who see in 
Morocco a key Arab and African ally and they are two out of five permanent members 
of the Security Council. (And commercially exploitable quantities of oil have not been 
an issue yet.) Without pressure it seems highly unlikely that Morocco would accept the 
Baker Plan II. 
The prospect of an early and peaceful resolution to the conflict remains elusive. As the 
political stalemate continues, the question raises: How long are the Ṣaḥrāwīs willing to 
endure in a situation of neither war nor peace and to continue to patiently wait for a 
peaceful solution before all hope has been abandoned? After years of peaceful 
struggle through diplomatic means for an issue that has the clear 
backing of international law, the threat that the  Ṣaḥrāwīs  take up 
arms and revert to violence again is greater than ever. War can not be 
the right way; it would generate more suffering, more refugees and disrupt the region. 
Negotiations are inevitable and it is necessary to review the register of voters. After 
over 30 years in the demonstrated conditions, a new generation of Ṣaḥrāwīs has grown 
up  very  with  little  perspective.  The Ṣaḥrāwī  resistance  to  foreign  control  was  a 
historical fact and will continue for generations to come. 
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The Western Sahara issue has to move up the priority list of the UN Security Council. 
Only a free and fair referendum can lead to a just, democratic and lasting resolution in 
line with UN doctrine and international legality and will contribute to the stability and 
progress of the whole Maghreb region.
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VI) Open letter written by former personal envoy of the UN Secretary General for 
Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum310
Sahara's long and troubled conflict
By PETER VAN WALSUM, published in El País on August 28, 2008.
I am writing this tribune as former personal envoy of the Secretary-General of the 
United  Nations  for  Western  Sahara.  I  was  originally  appointed  to  this  post  by 
Secretary-General Annan in August 2005, and the fifth semiannual extension of my  
appointment expired on August 21th last. The reason I am writing today is that I want  
to avail myself of the brief interlude between the time when I had to exercise restraint  
in  airing  my  personal  views  because  I  was  the  personal  envoy,  and  the  fast  
approaching time when nobody will be interested in my personal views because I am 
not the personal envoy any longer.
Given  the  33  years  that  the  dispute  about  Western  Sahara  has  endured,  I  am  
sometimes tempted to think that I have failed to find a solution because the question is  
insoluble.  If  I  resist  that  temptation,  it  is  because  I  continue  to  believe  that  with  
political will the question can be solved.
My analysis has not changed since I submitted my first oral report to the Security  
Council  in January 2006. I thought the two main ingredients of the impasse were  
Morocco's decision of April 2004 not to accept any referendum with independence as  
an option, and the Security Council's unwavering view that there must be a consensual  
solution to the question of Western Sahara. I focused on the latter, for - as I observed 
on the occasion - if the Council had been prepared to impose a solution, my analysis  
would have been very different. As it was, however, the need to find a consensual  
solution had to be the starting point of any analysis.
This led to my conclusion that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of  
the current  impasse,  or  direct  negotiations  between the parties.  Such negotiations  
would need to be embarked upon without preconditions, and I admitted it was only  
realistic to predict that, with Morocco in the possession of most of the territory and the  
Security Council unwilling to put pressure on it, the outcome would fall short of an 
independent Western Sahara.
This conclusion was criticized by those who felt it was unethical to expect Polisario to 
settle for political reality simply because Morocco and the Security Council failed to 
respect international legality, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 1514 of  
1960  (on  decolonization  and  self-determination)  and  the  International  Court  of  
Justice's  advisory  opinion  of  1975  (on  the  absence  of  pre-colonial  ties  between 
Morocco and Western Sahara that might affect the application of said resolution).  
This was not the kind of criticism a mediator could simply brush aside, but I felt it had 
to be weighed against the risk of giving Polisario false hope by encouraging it to  
disregard the undeniable fact that from the outset in 1975 the Security Council had 
consistently made it clear that it could only countenance a consensual solution.
310http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Sahara/s/long/and/troubled/conflict/elpepuint/2008082
8elpepuint_5/Tes [15.09.2008]
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Unfortunately, Polisario's backers generously supplied it with precisely that sort of  
encouragement. They insisted that sooner or later the Council would recognize that 
international legality had to be respected and oblige Morocco to accept a referendum 
with independence as an option.
The reason I do not believe this will happen is that international legality is not the  
same as international law. The Security Council naturally has to observe international  
law, but it also has to take into account political reality. The General Assembly, the 
Security Council and the International Court of Justice are all principal organs of the 
United Nations. There is no hierarchy among them, but each has specific powers,  
which are  described  in  the Charter of  the United Nations  and the Statute  of  the  
International Court of Justice. In article 24 of the Charter, member states confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace  
and security. To fulfil this responsibility the Council has no choice but to take political  
reality into account. If it does so, it acts within the bounds of its powers under the UN 
Charter and is thus observing international law.
The Council rarely discusses all the political factors taken into account by individual  
member states, so their relative weight in the genesis of a resolution will never become 
known, not even to the Council members themselves. Potential political factors may  
be, for example, fear of  the destabilising effect  of  coercive action, awareness that  
redress of an injustice 33 years after the fact may entail new injustices, or reluctance 
to contribute to the possible creation of another failed state.
When confronted with a dispute, the Council alone decides whether it will act under  
Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes) or Chapter VII (possible use of force in 
case of threats to the peace or acts of aggression), and it cannot be overruled by any  
other organ. There is no rule of international law that obliges the Security Council to 
use all the powers it has at its disposal to give effect to resolutions of the General 
Assembly or advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice.
This is why criticism of the Council's disregard for international legality has always 
had so little effect. Among the states members of the Council that most resolutely insist  
that there can only be a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara, I have  
never come across one that thought it might thereby be violating international law.  
This does  not  mean that  on the Council  no one  is  troubled about  the continuing  
impasse.  But  there  is  a  growing  awareness  that  Polisario's  insistence  on  full  
independence for Western Sahara has the unintended effect of deepening the impasse  
and perpetuating the status quo.
There is a way out, but it is an arduous one that would lead through tough, genuine  
negotiations. If Polisario could tentatively contemplate a negotiated solution short of  
full independence, it would instantly be assured of overwhelming international support  
for its self-evident insistence on solid, internationally anchored, guarantees against a 
future repeal of the agreed constitutional arrangement or a gradual erosion of civil  
liberties - such as freedom of speech - on grounds of national security. If at some time  
in the future Polisario is ready to explore this avenue, I hope it will not just introduce 
amendments  to  the  Moroccan  proposal  but  submit  a  comprehensive  autonomy 
proposal of its own.
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I do not expect that Polisario will take this step in the foreseeable future. For the time  
being,  nothing will  change:  Polisario will  continue  to demand a referendum with  
independence as an option, Morocco will continue to rule that out, and the Security  
Council will continue to insist on a consensual solution. Meanwhile the international  
community will continue to grow used to the status quo.
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ABSTRACT
Die  Westsahara  ist  eines  der  unwirtlichsten  und  trockensten  Gebiete  der  Welt. 
Dennoch ist das 266,000 km² große Gebiet heiß umkämpft. 
Als in den 60er Jahren die Entkolonialisierungswelle Afrikas einsetzte, forderten die 
Vereinten Nationen auch Spanien auf, ihre Kolonie, damals bekannt unter  Spanisch-
Sahara, zu entkolonialisieren und den  Ṣaḥrāwīs das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung zu 
gewähren. Spanien erklärte sich anfangs zur Durchführung eines Referendums bereit, 
durch welches die Ṣaḥrāwīs über ihre Zukunft entscheiden sollten. Allerdings zögerte 
Spanien dieses Referendum kontinuierlich hinaus. So entstand 1973 die  ṣaḥrāwīsche 
Befreiungsbewegung,  die Frente POLISARIO, welche den bewaffneten Widerstand 
gegen  die  Kolonialmacht  aufnahm.  1975  übergab  schließlich  Spanien  in  einem 
geheimen Abkommen die Westsahara an Marokko und Mauretanien. Der bewaffnete 
Kampf der Frente POLISARIO richtete sich nun gegen die neuen Besatzer und ein 
erbitterter  Krieg  begann.  Mauretanien  verzichtete  in  Folge  auf  seinen  Teil  der 
Westsahara, den nun Marokko völkerrechtswidrig annektierte. Die Ṣaḥrāwīs flohen in 
Massen  über  die  algerische  Grenze  und  harren  seit  nunmehr  33  Jahren  in  den 
Flüchtlingslagern von Tindūf aus, wartend auf die  Durchführung eines ihnen längst 
versprochenen Referendums. 
In  dem langen diplomatischen Kampf erlangten die Vereinten Nationen zwar einen 
Waffenstillstand zwischen Marokko und der Frente POLISARIO, welcher seit 1991 
anhält, warum aber wurde nach so langer Zeit noch immer keine unter demokratischen 
Prinzipien vertretbare politische Lösung für den Westsahara-Konflikt gefunden? Die 
vorliegende Diplomarbeit geht auf die Problematik, die dahinter steckt, ein.
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